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Beyond Retaliation
Cherie O’Neal Taylor*
Abstract: This article examines the compliance problem in the World Trade
Organization’s dispute settlement system, in particular upon the disputes that
went to retaliation and beyond. This article, using a case study approach, is the
only consideration of what happened in all of these disputes and the effects of
each upon the system. The article reveals four insights. First, the losing
respondents have manipulated the rules and the system to avoid compliance for
long periods and in some cases permanently. Second, the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) itself has gaps and flaws that enable such manipulation.
Third, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which oversees the system, is
currently limited in its ability to report and counteract compliance problems.
Fourth, retaliation has its limits. The article concludes with a section about
possible reforms for both the DSU and DSB that would improve the dispute
settlement system and the WTO.
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Anyone examining the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) dispute
settlement system must confront one issue. The system does not resolve
every dispute where the complainant prevails in a way the Member States
intended. What the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides for
is compliance by the losing respondent Member State within a reasonable
period of time, compensation by the losing respondent until compliance, or
WTO-authorized retaliation against the losing respondent until compliance.
What has happened is: (1) timely compliance by most respondents,1 (2) rare
use of compensation by respondents,2 and (3) some retaliation being
1 Multiple reviews have concluded that the compliance rate for the dispute settlement
system is quite high for any dispute settlement system. See William Davey, The WTO
Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. Int’l Econ. L. 17, 47 (2005)
(Compliance rate at the end of the first decade of 83%) [hereinafter Davey]; Valerie Hughes,
Working in WTO Dispute Settlement: pride without prejudice, A HISTORY OF LAW AND
LAWYERS IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM, at 414 (“The overall rate of compliance
with WTO dispute settlement rulings is very high – somewhere between 85 and 95 percent,
depending on when and how you count non-compliance.”).
2 Instances of compensation, which is voluntary only, include the U.S.—Section 110(5)
Copyright Act and the Upland Cotton disputes. See Petros C. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement
in the WTO: Mind Over Matter (EUI Working Paper, RSCAS 2016/04 (2016)), available at
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/35980/RSCAS_2015_34.pdf?sequence=1
[hereinafter Mavroidis].

57

Taylor_jci2 (Do Not Delete)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

12/5/2017 4:12 PM

38:55 (2017)

authorized and employed against respondents without the result expected.
Retaliation has not been the end for all of the disputes where used. Instead,
there has often been sustained non-compliance3 by the respondent, and this
non-compliance has often gone to and beyond retaliation.4
There is a large literature about the operation of the system, the
“problem of non-compliance,”5 the adequacy of,6 and the need to reform
3 “Sustained non-compliance” occurs when the respondent goes far beyond the allotted
time for compliance and either never takes action to comply or tries strategic inadequate
compliance to gain time. In all of the cases of sustained non-compliance, the respondent
faced a retaliation request made by the complainant under Article 22 of the DSU.
4 These disputes – the ones that went to retaliation and beyond – actually ended in several
different ways: 1) resolved by agreement after retaliation was authorized, 2) resolved after
retaliation was used for some time, 3) settled after retaliation went on for a sustained period
without the respondent compliance under the relevant WTO agreement, and 4) never
resolved. The eleven disputes that went to retaliation and beyond are: Hormones, See
Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb. 13,
1998) [hereinafter Hormones AB Report]; Bananas III, See Appellate Body Report,
European Communities–Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
WTO Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) [hereinafter Bananas III AB Report]; Regional
Aircraft, See two disputes – Decision by the Arbitrator, Canada–Export Credits and Loan
Guarantees for Regional Aircraft, WTO Doc. WT/DS222/ARB (Feb. 17, 2003) [hereinafter
Canada - Regional Aircraft] and Appellate Body Report, Brazil–Export Financing
Programmed for Aircraft, WTO Doc. WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Brazil Regional Aircraft]; Byrd Amendment, See Appellate Body Report, United States–Continued
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WTO Doc. WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R
(Jan. 16, 2003) [hereinafter U.S. - Byrd Amendment]; Antidumping Act of 1916, See
Appellate Body Report, United States–Antidumping Act of 1916, WTO Doc.
WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000) [hereinafter U.S. - Anti-Dumping
Act]; Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC), See Appellate Body Report, United States–Tax
Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations, WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24 2000)
[hereinafter FSC]; Upland Cotton, See Appellate Body Report, United States–Subsidies on
Upland Cotton, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/AB/R, March 3, 2015 [hereinafter U.S. – Upland
Cotton]; Gambling, See Appellate Body Report, United States–Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R, Apr.
7, 2005 [hereinafter U.S. – Gambling]; Zeroing See two disputes – Appellate Body Report,
United States–Laws, Regulations, and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins
(“Zeroing”), WTO Doc. WT/DS294/AB/R (Apr. 18, 2006)(EU as complainant) and
Appellate Body Report, United States–Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews,
WTO Doc. WT/DS322/AB/R (Jan. 9, 2007); and the COOL dispute, See Appellate Body
Report, United States–Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WTO
Doc. WT/DS384,386/AB/R (June 29, 2012) [hereinafter U.S. – COOL].
5 See also Rachel Brewster, The Remedy Gap: Institutional; Design, Retaliation, and
Trade Law Enforcement, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 102 (2011); Gary Horlick & Judith
Coleman, The Compliance Problems of the WTO, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 141, 142
(2007); Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a
Hard Place, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 763 (2000); Mark Wu, Rethinking the Temporary Breach
Puzzle: A Window on the Future of International Conflicts, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. 95, 98
(2016) (Attempting to analyze why since the WTO dispute settlement system allows for
temporary breaches without consequence, why WTO Member States do not take advantage
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WTO remedies,7 and proposed solutions for the non-compliance problem.8
What this scholarship has not offered is an examination of how the parties
and the WTO dealt with all of the disputes that reached the retaliation stage,
and went beyond.
A close examination of how these disputes actually resolved is
necessary for understanding the non-compliance problem at the WTO.
Non-compliance in these eleven disputes has stymied the DSU
requirements and expectations in the different ways. Almost all of them
involve sustained non-compliance but each was resolved in different ways.
Some of the disputes ended with negotiated settlements after retaliation was
threatened but not employed.9 One dispute ended in a negotiated settlement
in part because one of the complainants was unable to use the authorized
retaliation.10 One dispute has not resolved because the complainant is not in
a position to use its authorization to sanction the respondent.11 In others,
the respondent resisted compliance, suffered some period of retaliation, and
complied.12 In yet another group, the respondent faced sustained retaliation
and remained in non-compliance until the disputants reached a negotiated
of this feature more often).
6 For a thorough examination of all aspects of the ultimate remedy in the DSU system,
the authorization of retaliation against a non-compliant Member State, see generally THE
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (Chad P.
Brown and Joust Pauwelyn eds. 2010).
7 See Marco Bronkers & Naboth Van den Broek, Financial Compensation in the WTO:
Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L, 101, 121 (2005)
[hereinafter Bronkers & Van den Broek]; William J. Davey, Compliance Problems in WTO
Dispute Settlement, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 119, 125 (2009); Joel R. Trachtman, The
WTO Cathedral, 43 STANFORD J. INT’L L. 127 (2007)[hereinafter Trachtman – WTO
Cathedral]; Naboth Van den Broek, Power Paradoxes in Enforcement and Implementation of
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Reports: Interdisciplinary Approaches and
New Proposals, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 127, 134 (2003).
8 Korea, Ecuador, Mexico, and the African Group have filed major proposals for DSU
reform of the remedies regime. See Sonia E. Rolland, Considering Development in the
Implementation of Panel and Appellate Body Reports, 4 TRADE L. & DEV. 150 (2010) for an
analysis of the major reform proposals suggested by these groups. [hereinafter Rolland].
The DSU Reform Negotiations conducted as part of the Doha Round have produced a draft
text of changes to the DSU. This draft text along with a Report by the Chair of Negotiations
on the status of negotiations through April of 2011 has the most publicly available version of
what the revised text. Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Report by the
Chairman, Ambassador Ronald Saborío Soto, to the Trade Negotiations Committee
TN/DS/25 (April 21, 2011) [hereinafter DSB—Special Session].
9
See discussion infra Sections Regional Aircraft, Zeroing, Anti-Dumping Act of 1916,
Upland Cotton, and COOL.
10 See infra pp. 30–31 for a discussion of the experience of Ecuador in the Bananas III
dispute.
11 See infra pp. 57–59 for a discussion of the Gambling dispute.
12 See infra pp. 35–37 and 47–48 for a discussion of the FSC and Byrd Amendment
disputes.
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settlement that left the violation in place.13 The design of the compliance
section of the DSU systemwhere the form and shape of compliance rests
within the power of the disputants14creates the potential for such
variations.15
By most measures, the dispute settlement system of the WTO has been
a success.16 The WTO has resolved most of the disputes brought to it and
offered thorough and consistent interpretationslargely through the work
of the Appellate Body (AB)of the obligations contained in the WTO
agreements.17 During the long and frequently interrupted march of the
Doha Round of trade negotiations,18 which started in 2000 and remain
13

See infra pp. 23–26, 30–33 for a discussion of the Hormones and Bananas III disputes.
The compliance section of the WTO’s dispute settlement system is set out in Articles
21 and 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Understanding on the Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
15 See Jose E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences, 38
TEX. INT’L L.J. 405, 415 (2003) (noting that the WTO dispute settlement system is political
“both at its inception and at its end”).
16 Pascal Lamy, WTO disputes reach 400 mark, WTO Press Release 578 (Nov. 6, 2009),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres09_e/pr578_e.htm (Former Director General Lamy
noted on the occasion of the dispute settlement system reaching 400 disputes that” the
dispute settlement system is widely considered to be the jewel in the crown of the WTO” and
“[t]his is surely a vote of confidence in a system which many consider to be a role model for
the peaceful resolution of disputes in other areas of international political or economic
relations.”). See also Giorgio Sacerdoti, The Future of the WTO Dispute Settlement System:
Consolidating a Success Story, FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL TRADE ORDER (Carlos Primo Braga
and Bernard Hoekman eds., 2016) at 45 [hereinafter Sacerdoti].
17 The AB has garnered praise for developing strong working procedures and producing
reports that are usually regarded as clear, coherent, and legitimate. For a discussion of these
issues, see WTO Appellate Body Roundtable, Proceedings of the 99th Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 175 (2005) (presenting
views from three of the first seven AB members on how the AB set out to operate); see also
Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First
Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 30 (1999) (noting that the AB panels heavily
relied on the interpretation methods of Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (as authorized by the DSU art. 3.2) in order to be prudent and to give the “legal
rulings the greatest possible appearance of objective legal authority”); Joost Pauwelyn, The
Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26 (2005) (noting that the AB “like
more conventional judicial bodies, has opted for a rigorous, impartial, and strictly legal
approach to analyzing trade complaints”). For a more recent interpretation of the AB see
Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global governance by the
Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9 (2016) (contributions by Howse, Pauwelyn, Hoekman, Lang
and Fabri).
18 The Doha Round negotiations started in 2000, were suspended multiple times, and are
ongoing as of this date. The Member States have worked on all of these years on drafts of
texts, which represent potential agreements. The Doha Round has produced one major
agreement, the Trade Facilitation Agreement, completed in the 2013 Bali Ministerial
Conference. The Trade Facilitation Agreement went into force on February 22, 2017, when
two-thirds of the 164 WTO Member States completed ratification and notified the WTO. In
14
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unfinished in 2017, most have come to agree that the WTO is more
effective at resolving disputes than the rule-making.19 Despite this
agreement, there have been consistent calls by the Member States and
scholars for reform of the DSU, particularly with respect to its remedies.
What has been driving this demand for reform? One reason is that the
final remedy available to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)20 is a flawed
one. There are at least three obvious flaws. First, the use of DSBauthorized retaliation harms the state using it and undercuts the trade
liberalization goals of the WTO.21 Second, all remedies offered by the
the Nairobi Declaration for the 10th WTO Ministerial, the WTO Member States summed up
the still confused state of Doha Round negotiations with the following statements:
30. We recognize that many Members reaffirm the Doha Development Agenda, and the
Declarations and Decisions adopted at Doha and at the Ministerial Conferences held since
then, and reaffirm their full commitment to conclude the DDA on that basis. Other Members
do not reaffirm the Doha mandates, as they believe that new approaches are necessary to
achieve meaningful outcomes in multilateral negotiations. Members have different views on
how to address the negotiations. We acknowledge the strong legal structure of this
Organization. 31. Nevertheless, there remains a strong commitment of all Members to
advance negotiations on the remaining Doha issues.” World Trade Organization, Nairobi
Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN (15)/DEC (adopted Dec. 19, 2015), available
at: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc10_e/mindecision_e.htm. [hereinafter
Nairobi Ministerial Declaration].
19 For one expression of this idea and one explanation, see Manfred, Elsig, The
Functioning of the WTO: Options for Reform and Enhanced Performance. E15 Expert
Group on the Functioning of the WTO – Policy Options Paper, E15 INITIATIVE 9 (2016).
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic
Forum (According to Elsig: [W]e deal with a somewhat unintended consequence of
legalization. The enforcement mechanism of the WTO (“the jewel in the crown”) has led to
dynamics that additionally impact on trade negotiations. Under the shadow of a strong
dispute settlement system, where concessions can actually be enforced, parties are
sometimes reluctant to commit to future deals, and this has important distributional
consequences as domestic interest groups grow more vigilant . . . .”). Id.
20 The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) (comprised of all WTO Member States of the
WTO) plays the coordinating role for the DSU process. Member States must notify the DSB
of a dispute and of the request for a panel. DSU, supra note 14, at art. 12. The DSB also
oversees the establishment of a panel in a particular dispute. Id. at art. 8. Once the panel
process is underway, the DSB oversees it, and allows for any extension of time the panel
finds necessary. Id. at art. 12.9. Once produced, the final panel report circulates to the DSB
and becomes part of its agenda. The DSB takes comments until it takes action to adopt the
report. Id. at art. 16. The DSB plays a role regarding the implementation of the panel or
Appellate Body panel report. A losing respondent is required to notify the DSB of its plan to
implement. Id. at art. 21.3. The DSB assists disputants over conflicts regarding how
implementation should proceed. Id. at arts. 21.3 & 21.4. The DSB conducts surveillance of
the respondent’s implementation. Id. at art. 21.6. See infra pp. 91–100 for a discussion of
why and at pp. 93–100 for how the WTO must re-imagine the role of the Dispute Settlement
Body.
21 Retaliation harms the country imposing it because it increases the cost of imports from
a trading partner. The retaliating country then faces the choice of paying higher prices for
inputs or shifting to other countries to supply those inputs. See Peter Van den Bossche, THE
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WTO–compliance, temporary compensation until compliance, or
retaliation–are prospective in nature.22 Third, there are stark power
asymmetries within the organization that reveal the limits of the remedy.
Some WTO Member States, to date larger developed countries,23 have
resisted the legal rulings and the trade sanctions authorized to compel
compliance. By contrast, most of the other WTO Member States cannot24
risk using or facing retaliation.
Another reason there has been a push for DSU reform is that there are
gaps in the design and problems with the operation of the compliance
portion of the system. The DSU, as written, is inadequate with regard to the
issue of compliance, i.e., to what should happen after the respondent loses.
What reforms to the DSU and dispute settlement practice would make
the system more effective regard to the sustained non-compliance disputes?
This article provides one answer by offering, first, a review of the disputes
that have resulted in delayed,25 inadequate,26 and sustained non-compliance.
LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 223
(2005) (noting that “retaliation measures are trade destructive and the injured party imposing
these measures is also negatively affected by these measures”).
22 The prospective nature of the remedy is widely regarded as one of the problems with
the DSU remedy regime as it does not provide enough incentive for the losing respondent to
comply. See Andrew T. Guzman, International Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis, 157
U. PENN. L. REV. 171, 214 (2008).
23 See infra pp. 23–26 (Hormones), 30–33 (Bananas III), and 35–37 (FSC).
24 See Rolland, supra note 8, at 190-191 (noting that most developing countries have not
been able to make use of the retaliatory system in the WTO and that “trade asymmetries and
the limitations they pose to effective retaliation affects small developed countries as well as
developing countries”). See also Marco Bronkers & Freya Baetens, Reconsidering Financial
Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement, 16 J. INT’L ECON. LAW 281, 281 (2013).
25 Observers have noted that the least amount of time that it takes for a dispute to
complete if it goes to the Appellate Body for review is three years. This process goes even
longer if the case involves complex or highly contested facts. See Raj Bhala & Lucienne
Attard, Austin’s Ghost and DSU Reform, 37 INT’L L. 651, 661 (2003) (noting that, in
practice, Member States “believe they can go three years before having to worry about
compliance.”) See also Rachel Brewster, The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation,
and Trade Enforcement, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 102, 117–25 (2011) (for a full analysis of
the time it takes to complete DSU proceedings and what the delay means in practice)
[hereinafter Brewster]. For the most recent statistics on the time WTO dispute settlement
proceedings take at each step see Louise Johannesson & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO
Dispute Settlement System 1995-2016 at 8-14, (European University Institute, RCAS
2016/72 EUI Working Papers, 2016) [hereinafter Johannesson & Mavroidis].
26 “Inadequate compliance” occurs when a respondent represents before the complainant
and the DSB that is has implemented but compliance review under Article 21.5 of the DSU
concludes that it still has not come into compliance with the recommendations of the DSB.
It is even possible that a respondent can comply, receive a blessing on its compliance in an
Article 21.5 compliance review, and then re-enact a measure similar to the original WTOillegal measure. See David R. Townsend & Steve Charnovitz, Preventing Opportunistic
Uncompliance by WTO Members, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 437, 439–47 (2011) (identifying the
practice as one that occurred in Upland Cotton and calling it as “uncompliance”) [hereinafter
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Additionally, this review analyzes not only what happened in each dispute
but also the legacy each has left the system. The second section of the
article isolates the limitations in the DSU system revealed by the sustained
non-compliance disputes. The third section of the article assesses the DSU
reform process conducted by the WTO and whether it offers any solutions
to the limitations revealed. Under examination in this section is the
adequacy of the proposed reforms of the compliance and enforcement
sections of the DSU. The article concludes with a proposed solution on
how to enhance DSB surveillance. Despite the gains that might come from
adopting a new remedy,27 the WTO can make a slightly reformed system
work and, importantly for legitimacy purposes, appear to work.28 What is
required, however, is a re-imagined role for the WTO acting as an
organization and as the Dispute Settlement Body.
I.

INTRODUCTION: THE REALITY OF COMPLIANCE IN THE
DSU SYSTEM
The case for reforming the DSU remedy regime stems from critiques
of what has happened in disputes involving delayed, inadequate, and
sustained non-compliance. What exactly is the record of the DSU system in
producing compliance with its decisions? Answering this question requires
examining not only what has happened in the dispute settlement system but
also what the DSU intended regarding compliance.
How the DSU Process Operates
WTO Members undertake several obligations relating to dispute
settlement: (1) to bring all disputes based on any WTO agreement29 into the
Townsend & Charnovitz].
27 See Trachtman – WTO Cathedral, supra note 7, at 156–66 (discussing all aspects of
how developing countries might benefit from a remedy system that focused on some form of
monetary compensation); see also Bronckers & Van den Broek, supra note 7, for a similar
discussion.
28 The legitimacy spoken of here is the legitimacy the system holds in the eyes of its
Member States. See Cosette D. Creamer & Zuzanna Godzimirska, (De)Legitimation at the
WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 275, 275–81(According to
Creamer and Godzmirska, legitimacy of institutions and international courts has both a
normative and an empirical dimension. The normative dimension is based on whether the
international court is worthy of support. The empirical dimension of legitimacy can be
measured by examining the constituent views that support the court’s exercise of authority.)
[hereinafter Creamer & Godzimirska].
29 The WTO dispute settlement process is triggered when a Member State complains that
a benefit it expected under a GATT Agreement has been “nullified or impaired” by: (1) the
failure of another Member State to carry out its obligations under the GATT, (2) the
application by another Member State of any measure whether or not it conflicts with the
GATT, or (3) the existence of any other situation. The WTO adopted a new dispute
settlement mechanism in the DSU it retained the subject matter basis for all claims from the
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system for resolution;30 (2) to consult with other Member States prior to
entering into the arbitral process to resolve the dispute;31 and (3) to settle
any dispute by reaching a mutually satisfactory solution or complying if it
loses with the recommendations of the arbitral process.
If the disputants do not reach a settlement after consultations, the
dispute will go through the DSU arbitral process.32 If the disputants go to
arbitration, the panel must hear the dispute and render a report.33
If it loses, the respondent must comply by withdrawing the offending
measure(s).34 As an alternative, the respondent (and the complainant) may
appeal the legal determinations made by the panel.35 After the AB renders a
decision on any appeal, a losing respondent must again comply by
withdrawing the offending measure(s) within a reasonable period.36 The
language set out in Article XXIII of the GATT. When filing a request for consultations
under the DSU, the complainant must state whether the claim is brought under Art. XXII of
the GATT (which allowed for mediation only) or Art. XXIII (which allowed for GATT
dispute settlement). See DSU, supra note 14, at art. 3.1.
30 A Member State can file a dispute alone or with other countries. See the Shrimp/Turtle
dispute, Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, ¶ 121, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), which was filed and
prosecuted by India, Pakistan, Malaysia and Pakistan against the United States. That dispute
began with multiple requests for consultations, see, e.g., Request for the Establishment of a
Panel by Malaysia and Thailand, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/6 (Jan. 10, 1997) (requesting input on Section 609);
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Pakistan, United States–Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/7 (Feb. 7, 1997) (requesting
input on Section 609); Request for Establishment of a Panel by India, United States–Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/8 (Mar. 4, 1997)
(requesting input on Section 609), but was combined into one case for the issuance of the
panel and AB reports.
31 DSU, supra note 14, at arts. 3.7 and 4.4. A WTO dispute begins when a Member State
or group of Member States files a request for consultations with a respondent Member State
setting out the basis for a claim—the violation of any WTO agreement(s) or the loss of
benefits. If consultations between or among the disputants fail to resolve the dispute leading
to a withdrawal of the claim or a mutually agreed solution, then the complainant(s) can ask
for the appointment of an arbitral panel.
32 Id. at art. 6 (Establishment of Panels), art. 11 (Function of Panels) and art. 16
(Adoption of Panel Reports).
33 Id. at art. 12.7.
34 Id. at art. 3.7.
(“In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement
mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of measures the concerned if these are found
to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements.”)
35 Id. at arts. 16.4, 17.4 & 17.6.
36 It is possible that the losing respondent could implement the recommendations of the
DSB by removing the offending measure immediately. However, if it is “impracticable to
comply immediately,” the respondent is given a “reasonable period of time” to comply. Id.
at art. 21.3. The respondent is entitled to an arbitral panel on the issue of what constitutes a
reasonable time under the circumstances of the case if that is not agreed upon by the
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respondent can settle the case even after the arbitral process has completed
through reaching a mutually agreed solution.37 A respondent may offer
compensation;38 however, any compensation is a temporary measure to be
employed pending full compliance. Should the respondent fail to take any
action after the running of its reasonable period for compliance, the
complainant may seek authorization from the DSB to suspend concessions
(either tariff or other concessions) against the respondent.39 The retaliation
is prospective only and limited to amount of harm suffered by the
complainant Member State.40
If the respondent takes action to comply within the reasonable period
but the complainant has doubts about that compliance, the DSU allows for a
challenge to the respondent’s implementation. This part of the system is a
compliance review41 and operates by reinstating the original panel to review
the respondent’s actions and claims of compliance. This compliance review
is also subject to appeal and appellate review.42 If this second level of
disputants. Id. at art. 21.3.
37 See id. at art. 3.7 (“The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive
solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent
with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred. In the absence of a mutually agreed
solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the
withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the
provisions of any of the covered agreements”.)
38 Id. at arts. 22.1 & 22.2.
39 Id. at. art. 22.2. If the suspension of concessions stage is reached in a dispute, the
complaining party is required to retaliate only within the GATT world. It should first seek to
suspend concessions in the same sector of trade in which a violation was found. If such a
response is not “practicable or effective,” then the complaining party can turn to other
sectors of trade in the same GATT agreement, or in sufficiently serious circumstances, to
another GATT agreement altogether. In the worst-case scenario–where the nullification or
impairment of benefits is severe and the offending party refuses to withdraw the offending
measure or compensate–the DSU authorizes cross retaliation. For example, a country that
was having its benefits under the Agriculture Agreement nullified or impaired by illegal
subsidies could retaliate under the TRIPs Agreement by withdrawing protection for
intellectual property rights held by foreigners.
40 The complaining country in a WTO dispute is cannot to determine the amount or
extent of retaliation by itself. Any retaliation must be proportional–equivalent to the level of
nullification or impairment–and can be objected to by the offending country. Thus, the level
of retaliation can become the subject of an arbitral decision. The DSB surveillance done to
ensure equitable retaliation, however, should not obscure the WTO goal of coercing the
offending country into compliance with its GATT obligations. To the extent, it is possible to
enforce a decision against a country; the drafting of the DSU achieves that goal in most
cases.
41 DSU, supra note 14, at art. 21.5.
42 Although the DSU as written does not offer a right to AB, review of compliance
review decisions that practice has always been followed. See Yang Guohua, Bryan Mercurio
and Li Yongjie, WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING: A DETAILED INTERPRETATION
242 (2005) (stating that “in disputes as to the consistency of the measures taken to comply
with the rulings of the DSB, the parties will undergo consultations and, if necessary, the
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litigation reveals that there has been no or inadequate compliance–that the
violation has not been eliminated–the complainant is allowed to seek
authorization by the DSB to suspend concessions. This suspension of
concessions—or use of trade sanctions or retaliation—is meant to be
temporary. It is to be applied only “until such time as the measure found to
be inconsistent with the covered agreement has been removed,” or the
respondent “provides a solution to the nullification or impairment of
benefits” or the disputant agrees that a “mutually satisfactory solution.” 43
The drafters of the DSU made no provision for what would occur after the
DSB authorized retaliation or how retaliation, if employed, would end. The
sole paragraph of the DSU devoted to such issues merely states that the
DSB shall “continue to keep under surveillance the implementation of
adopted recommendations or rulings.”44
Member- and Institution-Driven Aspects of the System
The WTO created the DSU to be a self-enforcing system, one that
leaves the Member States to determine when to invoke the system, what
parts of it to use and how to achieve relief. The DSU system, however,
operates within the larger organization.45 Thus, it is impossible to
understand how the system operates without examining how the memberdriven and institution-driven aspects of the system play out.
On the member-driven side, two aspects of the system stand out as
crucial—the role of settlements and the way DSU decisions affect the trade
policies of Member States. Negotiations, and the settlements arising from
them, are a key feature of the system. As designed, the DSU provides the
Member States with the right to bring claims against each other 46 and it
establishment of a panel and appellate review) [hereinafter Guohua, Mercurio & Yongjie].
The measures examined in a compliance review are new ones—those taken by the
respondent to implement the DSB recommendation to bring its measure into compliance
with WTO law. Consequently, the claims, arguments and facts in a compliance review will
usually be different from those discussed and analyzed in the original dispute. See Appellate
Body Report, Canada—Regional Aircraft, supra, note 4, at ¶ 41.
43 DSU, supra note 14, at art. 22.8.
44 Id. at art. 22.8.
45 The WTO is a Member State organization. The Members do bring disputes against
each other in the system described by the DSU as “a central element in providing security
and predictability to the multilateral trading system.” Id. at art. 3.2. However, in the dispute
settlement system Member States not only act as parties but as enforcers of the rules as part
of the DSB. Moreover, dispute settlement is only one of the main functions of the WTO.
The organization also has two other main functionsrulemaking and surveillance of rule
implementation. The Member States negotiate the WTO agreements through consensus.
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) at arts. III.2 & IX.1. The Member States also oversee
implementation of the existing WTO agreements. Id. at art. III.1.
46 Id. at art. 3.7.
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establishes a panel system and the AB to “clarify the existing provisions” of
WTO agreements. However, the disputants’ right to negotiate a “mutually
agreed solution”47 to the problem starts from the beginning and remains
available throughout the entirety of a dispute and its resolution.48 The
disputants can always end a case by withdrawing a complaint, abandoning
it or by coming to a mutually agreed solution. The DSU does impose some
discipline on such settlements. Article 3.7 states that mutually agreed
solutions are the preferred remedy in the WTO dispute settlement system
and that they must be: (1) consistent with WTO agreements; (2) not nullify
or impair the rights of any Member; and (3) not impede the attainment of
the objectives of any WTO agreement.49
In practice, some disputants have gone beyond this and reached
agreements both on how the DSU rules operate50 and on how to resolve the
disputes where there has been sustained non-compliance. Several of the
cases that have gone to retaliation and beyond have truly resolved51 only
with one of these Member-crafted negotiated settlements. These disputes
47 The DSU does not define the term “mutually agreed solution.” However, the DSU
makes it clear how important such settlements are.
48 See DSU, supra note 14, at arts. 4.3 (purpose of the consultations is to reach mutually
agreed solution), 11 (the parties to a dispute are given the chance during the arbitral process
to reach a mutually satisfactory solution), 12.7 (only after failure to reach a mutually
satisfactory solution does the arbitral panel submit its report on the dispute to the Dispute
Settlement Body), 22.2 (the parties can reach a mutually satisfactory solution after the
reasonable period given for compliance has run) & 22.8 (the parties can end the use of DSBauthorized sanctions by reaching a mutually agreed solution).
49 Id. at art. 3.7.
50 The leading example is the Member negotiated agreement on how to handle the
sequencing of the rights to seek and full compliance review (Art. 21.5) and the right to seek
sanctions against the respondent which has failed to comply (Art. 22.6). According to Art.
21.5, if the parties to a dispute end up in a “disagreement as to the existence or consistency
with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and
rulings” there can be review (whenever possible by the original panel) of the contested
implementing measure. DSU art. 21.5. At the same time, Article 22 states that if a losing
party fails to comply within a reasonable period, the winning party is entitled to invoke the
process for seeking DSB authorization for a suspension of concessions. Id. at art. 22.2.
Neither Art. 21.5 nor Art. 22.2 refer to each other. Consequently, the proper order or
sequence that disputing parties should follow is unclear. The resulting gap in the DSU led to
a political dispute and negotiations during the Bananas III dispute. See also Guohua,
Mercurio & Yongjie, supra note 42, at 273–79 for a full discussion of the sequencing debate
that arose in the Bananas III dispute. The Member-crafted resolution to the sequencing issue
has been accepted as a solution to the original textual ambiguity. See DSBSpecial
Session, supra note 8, at A-15 (revealing the proposed amendments to DSU art. 22.2 *bis*
that would expressly limit the right to pursue retaliation until after the complainant has had
recourse to the Art. 21.5 compliance review process.) This draft text along with a Report by
the Chair of Negotiations on the status of negotiations through April of 2011 has been
derestricted.
51 See infra pp. 23–27, 30–34 & 51–54 for a discussion of the Hormones, Bananas III,
and Upland Cotton disputes, respectively.
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were resolved with a mutually agreed solution that was actually an interim
settlement52with settlements that “typically outline compliance steps
towards a final solution of the dispute” that will occur later. These interim
settlements are not actually consistent with the DSU. This end game for
troubled disputes can occur because the DSU lacks a procedure for what
happens if retaliation does not resolve the dispute.
The other Member-driven aspect of the dispute settlement system is
that it delivers answers about trade law but not changes in trade policy.
True resolution of a WTO dispute that ends in favor of the complainant
occurs only when the losing respondent internalizes the decision reached by
the DSU process. If the case is resolved through negotiations, the
respondent must accommodate the new understanding or settlement in its
trade or regulatory policy. If the dispute goes through the whole DSU
process, including the use of retaliation, the same thing must happen but
under difficult political conditions. Most often disputes go through the full
process either because the respondent believes the measure(s) targeted by
the case are too politically important to abandon53 or because of a well or
ill-founded belief about its legality.54
Once the respondent has lost the legal fight, the dispute turns into a
compliance matter. Compliance is also inherently political. For one thing,
there is no single way to comply. The DSU suggests that the goal of the
arbitral panel part of the system is to “secure the withdrawal of the
measures concerned.”55 However, a losing respondent is not always in a
position to make a measure simply disappear. What frequently happens is
that the respondent must choose from a variety of options for compliance.
It can pass a WTO-consistent new statute or regulation (that responds to the
AB report on the WTO law in the dispute), approach the same trade or
regulatory goal it seeks by new method or by abandon its goal and building
a domestic political consensus around a new policy.56 Large developed
52 Wolfgang Alschner, Amiable Settlements of WTO Disputes: Bilateral Solutions in a
Multilateral System, 13 WORLD TRADE REV. 65, 68, 72 (2014) (Alschner coined the term
“interim settlements” and has pointed out that the DSU does not provide authorization for
this type of settlement as any mutually agreed solution should be consistent with WTO
agreements.)[hereinafter Alschner]. Interim settlements used by WTO Member States
always leave the violative measure in place for longer either than the respondent is allowed
or in some cases permanently.
53 See infra pp. 23–27, 30–34 for a full illustration of this in the Hormones and Bananas
III disputes.
54 See infra pp. 34–38, 60–63 for a discussion of this in the Foreign Sales Corporation
and Zeroing disputes.
55 DSU, supra note 14, at art. 3.7.
56 See C. O’Neal Taylor, Impossible Cases: Lessons from the First Decade of WTO
Dispute Settlement, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 309, 415 (2007) for an illustration involving
the FSC dispute (where the U.S. shifted to a tax cut for U.S. corporations after trying and
failing to save the FSC program) [hereinafter Impossible Cases].
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countries with active democracies face difficulties complying because they
receive large amounts of civil society input about any particular dispute and
its outcome.57 These countries also receive input and assistance58 from
domestic industries regarding which WTO cases to bring, how to conduct
that litigation and how to resolve the dispute. Thus, WTO respondents are
pressured by a focused constituency about how to resolve a tough dispute.
Two institution-driven aspects of the DSU system operates also
explain why WTO disputes end as they do: (1) the WTO plays a role in
every dispute and (2) the DSU has a role. While Member States have
control at the beginning and the end of disputes, the WTO provides the
arbitral process for resolving the dispute and the DSB tries to oversee the
end. The DSB must receive notification about the filing of disputes59 and it
should receive notification when they are settled.60 The DSB adopts the
panel or AB report in each dispute and thus serves as the body
recommending that the respondent bring itself into compliance with the
legal rulings of the system.61 The DSB then engages in what the DSU
labels “surveillance” of the compliance of the respondent. The DSB puts
all decided disputes on its agenda for monthly meetings where it receives
reports as well as questions and complaints about compliance by losing
respondents.62 The DSB establishes compliance reviews63 when the
complainant alleges that the losing respondent has failed to comply.
Finally, the DSB authorizes the suspensions of concessions for respondents
finally adjudged as having failed to comply.64
The DSB successfully plays its role in running the arbitral process.
Where the DSB fails is at surveillance—as the overseer of compliance. The
requirement that losing respondents file status reports on compliance does
not provide any true discipline. Respondents often file status reports that do
not share any information about plans or efforts to comply. 65 The DSB

57

See infra 63–69 for this in the COOL dispute.
Gregory C. Shaffer, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO
LITIGATION 23–24 (2003) (discussing U.S. support for Chiquita Brands’ opposition to the EC
banana licensing regime) [hereinafter Shaffer].
59 DSU, supra note 14, at art. 4.4.
60 Id. at art. 3.6. See also Guohua, Mercurio & Yongjie, supra note 42, at 23 (“To
guarantee the objectives [of the DSU], this understanding also requires the parties to a
dispute to notify the DSB and the relevant councils and committees of any mutually agreed
solution.”).
61
DSU, supra note 14, at arts. 16.4 and 17.14.
62 Id. at art. 21.6.
63 Id. at art. 21.5.
64 Id. at art. 22.
65 See Guohua, Mercurio & Yongjie, supra note 42, at 245 (noting that “nothing more
than status reports are required from respondents at the DSB meetings during the compliance
period and that “no progress need be shown in the reports”).
58
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does not follow up, question the respondent, or compile information about
compliance. Rather, the DSB simply collects responses by Member States
about a lack of compliance in particular disputes, and non-compliance as a
problem for the system.66 The inadequate surveillance done by the DSB has
played a large role in the disputes that go to retaliation and beyond.67
The DSUwhich provides the procedural framework for all
disputesis flawed with regard to the end stage of disputes. The DSU
process came largely from the dispute settlement system employed in the
GATT, the predecessor to the WTO.68 However, there were innovations
added when the WTO chose to adopt a more adjudicative model for dispute
resolution.69 The DSU added the Appellate Body and gave it a role to play
in reviewing original panel reports and compliance review reports.70
Another major innovation was to create an enforcement phase for
disputes.71 The GATT dispute settlement system allowed the GATT
membership to authorize retaliation.72 The GATT system, however, lacked
what the DSU established in Articles 21 and 22—a process for disputants to
work through both to induce compliance and to respond to noncompliance.73 The Appellate Body innovation has operated quite well. By
66 The majority of the comments made in the monthly status meetings DSB meetings “are
made in the context of surveillance of implementation of DSB recommendations and other
issues related to compliance with dispute rulings”.) Cosette D. Creamer & Zuzanna
Godzimirska, The Rhetoric of Legitimacy: Mapping Members’ Expressed Views on the
WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, iCourts Working Paper, No 16 (Feb. 2015) at 10
available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2560780&download=yes
[hereinafter Rhetoric of Legitimacy].
Member States also make other statements to the DSB. A large proportion of statements are
made at the time of the adoption of the panel and AB reports by the DSB. By contrast, these
“statements typically comment on legal interpretations developed or procedural decisions
issued by panels or the Appellate Body.” Creamer & Godzimirska, supra note 28, at 286.
67 See infra pp. 62, 23–26, 30–34 for illustrations in the Zeroing, Hormones, and Bananas
III disputes.
68 See Robert E. Hudec, Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement,
IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES: ISSUES & LESSONS FROM THE
PRACTICE OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL COURTS & TRIBUNALS 369, 372–76 (Friedl Weiss ed.,
2000)[hereinafter Hudec].
69 See Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of
the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOB. TRADE 1, 7–11 (1999).
70 See Impossible Cases, supra note 56, at 313–14.
71 See Hudec, supra note 68, at 376 (describing the lack of any enforcement system in the
GATT where the losing respondent faced “no time limit on the order to comply, and the
process could drag on for years”).
72 It was possible for the winning complainant to request retaliation but these requests
could and were when requested vetoed by the losing respondent. Id. at 376.
73 See Hudec, supra note 68, at 393 (“Judging by the text of the DSU, one of the main
objections to the GATT dispute settlement was the lack of any follow-up procedure for
approved legal rulings… the negotiations… set forth a precise procedure and schedule for
what happens after a ruling is adopted.”).
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contrast, the enforcement phase of the DSU has prompted disagreements
among the membership, litigation by the Member States, and attracted the
greatest number of reform proposals in the DSU reform negotiations.74 The
enforcement phase of the DSU has both gaps75 and a limited conception of
what it means for the DSB to conduct surveillance over compliance (Article
21) or oversee the suspension of concessions (Article 22).76
Most of the WTO cases are resolved in accordance with the DSU
process. However, a small number, eleven,77 have required extended
surveillance and the authorization of retaliation by the DSB. The number of
these disputes is small but the impact of these disputes has not been. These
disputes have resulted in questionable practices by the disputants and
criticism of the system because of how these disputes have, and sometimes
have not, worked out. In some of these disputes,78 the complainants never
used the DSB authorization of retaliation and the disputants settled the case.
In all of the others, there was delayed and inadequate compliance, the use of
retaliation often for many years, extended WTO litigation by the
disputants79 over every aspect of compliance and non-compliance, and
heavily negotiated and ad hoc settlements.
Only a limited number of WTO Member States have been the major
players80 in the disputes involving sustained non-compliance and the
presence of these Member States has been crucial. To date, the countries
involved as complainants and respondents pushing disputes to a resolution
74 See generally THOMAS A. ZIMMERMANN, NEGOTIATING THE REVIEW OF THE WTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING 148–65, 204–09 (2006) [hereinafter Zimmermann].
75 See infra pp. 16–17 and 77 for a discussion of one gap—the lack of a post retaliation
procedure. This had led to a host of problems such as how the DSB should respond to a
respondent passing a new measure to comply after sanctions have been authorized and used.
See WTO INSTITUTIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 518 (Riidiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias
Stoll & Karen Kaiser, eds., 2006).
76 See Guohua, Mercurio & Yongjie, supra note 42, at 245–46. See infra pp. 75–77 for a
discussion of the flawed surveillance of the DSB.
77 See supra note 4 and infra pp. 69–74 for a discussion of the problems revealed by the
eleven disputes.
78 See infra pp. 51–54, 62–63, 40–41, and 67–68 for a discussion of the Upland Cotton,
Zeroing, Regional Aircraft, and COOL disputes.
79 In the Hormones dispute, there was actually a second-generation set of cases about the
use of retaliation. The EU filed two cases against the U.S. and Canada for continuing to
maintain sanctions authorized as part of the Hormones case after the EU argued that it has
complied. See WTO, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European
Communities, UNITED STATES - CONTINUED SUSPENSION OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE EC HORMONES DISPUTE (2005); WTO, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the
European Communities, CANADA - CONTINUED SUSPENSION OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE EC HORMONES DISPUTE (2005).
80 This is a listing of those Member States participating as complainants and the
respondents. Many more WTO Member States have participated in the sustained noncompliance disputes as Third Parties.
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are (listed according to frequency): United States (nine), the EU (six),
Canada (five), Brazil (four), Mexico (three), Japan (three), Ecuador (one),
Antigua (one), Australia (one), Chile (one), Guatemala (one), Honduras
(one), India (one), Indonesia (one), Korea (one) and Thailand (one). The
role of the largest and most powerful WTO Member States is the most
noticeable aspect of these disputes. The United States has been involved in
almost every case—the respondent in seven of these disputes and the
complainant in two.81 The EU has been the respondent in two disputes and
the complainant in four others.82
Systemic Compliance versus Inadequate and Sustained Non-Compliance
The WTO DSU statistics reveal a high level of systematic compliance.
According to its official tabulationthe Current Status of Disputesas of
September 2017, most of the disputes filed in the system have been
resolved with no dispute over compliance.83 A large number of cases, 27%,
never move past the consultations phase.84 The disputant, for whatever
reason, decide not to pursue the dispute.85 In a certain percentage of cases,
9%, a panel is established but not composed to hear the dispute, the panel is
composed but never issues a report, the parties do not seek adoption of the
81 The U.S. was the respondent in FSC, Upland Cotton, Gambling, Antidumping Act of
1916, Byrd Amendment and Zeroing, and COOL disputes. The U.S. was the complainant in
Hormones and Bananas III.
82 The EU was the respondent in Bananas III and Hormones disputes. The EU was the
complainant against the U.S. in FSC, Zeroing, the Byrd Amendment, and Antidumping Act of
1916 disputes.
83 The WTO maintains and updates an accounting of the status and outcomes of all DSU
disputes on the Dispute settlement page of the WTO website. WORLD TRADE ORG., CURRENT
STATUS OF DISPUTES, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_current_status_e.
htm (last visited September 25, 2017) [hereinafter Current Status Report]. All of the
statistics used in this article come from this official accounting by the WTO. Periodically the
WTO DSB publishes an Overview of the State of Play of WTO Disputes. The most recent
version of the Overview comes as an Addendum to the WTO Annual Report for 2014. See
WORLD TRADE ORG., OVERVIEW OF THE STATE OF DISPUTES ANNUAL REPORT ADDENDUM
(2014), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&
CatalogueIdList=128838,120508,92133,99233,107504,102197,94202,70311,58777,51691&
CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord
=True&HasSpanishRecord=True [hereinafter 2014 Overview]. As of September 25, 2017,
530 disputes have been brought to the WTO dispute settlement system.
84 See supra Current Status Report. One hundred and sixty disputes are listed as still in
consultations, some going back to 1995 when the WTO dispute settlement system began. If
the most recent cases to enter consultations are subtracted from this total – the sixteen
disputes that started consultations in 2016 and 2017, then approximately 27% of the disputes
have never left this phase.
85 See Amelia Porges, Settling WTO Disputes: What Do Litigation Models Tell Us?, 19
OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 141, 164–70 (2003) for a discussion and analysis of when Members
settle disputes.
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panel or AB report or the authority for a panel lapses.86 Approximately
18% of the cases that go to a panel or to an AB panel are settled or
terminated prior to the adoption of any DSU report.87 Together these
categories of results account for what happens to 54% of all WTO disputes.
Of the cases that go to a panel and/or on a review by an AB panel,
approximately 5.5% are victories for the respondent88 and as a result require
no further action. When the dispute results in a victory for the complainant,
approximately 17% of the disputes are resolved when the respondent takes
some action to implement the recommendation of the panel or AB panel.89
Another set of disputes that go through DSU proceedings and resolve
through a mutually acceptable solution or implementation; and these
account for 4% of the total number of disputes.90 Finally, there is a set of
disputes that go through proceedings but the disputants never fully notify
the DSB of the resolution. This category accounts for 8% of all disputes. 91
What these statistics, covering 88.5 % of the cases reveal,92 is satisfaction
achieved through consultations, implementation by the respondent,
mutually satisfactory settlements, or by resolution in some period or fashion
that satisfied the complainant.
There has been relatively little use of the final remedy93—the
suspension or concessions. According to the WTO Current Status Report,
the DSB authorized retaliation as the final step for only six disputes. The
WTO keeps Current Status Report statistics, however, in a manner that
makes it impossible to unpack what actually occurred in the cases that went
to retaliation and beyond. The WTO classifies each dispute in the Current
Status report as falling under only one category. The WTO explains that
this summary report “is intended to reflect the current status of disputes,
based on the most recent event having taken place in the proceedings for
each dispute.” The report reflects whatever the disputants report in their

86 See Current Status Report, supra note 79. (panel established not composed – 26
disputes; panel composed no report – 12 without the 7 from 2016 and 2017 panel authority
lapsed –12). These have all be added together to hit the 9%.
87 Id. The Current Status Report lists ninety-six disputes in this category.
88 Id. Twenty-nine disputes are listed in this category.
89 Id. Eighty-nine disputes are listed in this category.
90 Id. Twenty-three disputes are listed in this category.
91 Id. Forty-two disputes are listed as falling within this category.
92 Id. The percentages do not add up to 100% because some disputes are listed as in the
early stages of consultations, or as involving appeals, requests for retaliations, and retaliation
being granted.
93 According to the WTO, there have been only seven cases where retaliation was
authorized. However, these seven disputes cover only four matters – Byrd Amendment;
Regional Aircraft (Brazil v. Canada); Gambling, COOL, and in United States – Measures
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381
(where Mexico was authorized to suspend concessions in May 2017).
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last notification to the DSB.94 All of this makes it impossible to track from
the summary all of the cases where retaliation played a role as a credible
threat compelling settlement or implementation or to encourage an ad hoc
settlement of some type after retaliation was used. The actual number of
disputes where retaliation has played such roles is almost double the
number reported by the WTO. 95 Moreover, it is important to note that
compliance by all respondents takes place under the shadow of retaliation.96
Any reading of the statistics kept by the WTO does suggest that retaliation
serves as an effective threat.97
The Sustained Non-Compliance Disputes
What follows is a series of short case studies setting out: (1) the basis
for the dispute; (2) the role of retaliation; (3) what happened beyond
retaliation and 4) the legacy, if any, left for the DSU system. The case
studies are in chronological order and focus on implementation rather than
on the legal issues raised in the dispute.98
94 According to Sacerdoti and his statistics for 2016, when there were 500 disputes, only
282 disputes went through the full DSU process. Of those that did not go through the panel
process, 110 were resolved through bilateral negotiations, including formal withdrawal of
the complaint, while in the remaining 108 the disputants have failed to inform the DSB about
the status of the dispute. Sacerdoti says that these 108 disputes must be “considered dormant
or de facto settled.” Sacerdoti, supra note 16, at 53.
The fact that so many of the disputes cannot be properly accounted for in the Current Status
report makes these statistics of limited value.
95 As pointed out earlier, there are eleven disputes where retaliation has played a pivotal
role. In addition to the four disputes in this article noted in footnote 93 supra, there are three
disputes, Hormones, Bananas III, and FSC, that turned on the use of retaliation, listed in the
Current Status Report as “mutually acceptable solution on implementation notified.” The
other disputes where retaliation was authorized and that authorization persuaded the
respondent to offer a settlement or withdraw the trade policy under attack also include the
Regional Aircraft (Canada v. Brazil), Antidumping Act of 1916, Upland Cotton, and Zeroing,
disputes.
96 There is extensive scholarly examination of why most of the losing respondents
comply. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Calculation and Design of Trade Retaliation in Context:
What is the Goal of Suspending WTO Obligations, THE LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS OF
RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 34, 59 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds.,
2010); Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and
Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S179, S194 (2002).
There is no doubt that the Member States are committed to the organization and to
maintaining their reputations for complying with their obligations. Id. But there is every
reason to believe that the ultimate remedy, the right to request and thereby threaten
retaliation, plays a role as well.
97 See infra pp. 57-60 for a discussion of where this may not be true – where the threat of
retaliation is being made by a small developing country against a large developed country.
That is what happened in the Gambling dispute.
98 Much more could be written about every one of the eleven disputes examined here
including an analysis of whether the Appellate Body decisions and those of the Art. 21.5
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EU: Hormones (WT/DS 26)
Basis for dispute
The basis for the Hormones dispute was the claim by the United States
and Canada in 199699 that an EU ban on hormone-fed beef violated Articles
2, 3 and 5 of the Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Agreement (SPS
Agreement).100 A DSU panel determined in 1997 that the ban was
inconsistent with Articles 3 and 5 of the SPS Agreement. The Appellate
Body report, issued after both sides appealed, determined that the ban was
not “based on” a risk assessment as required under the terms of Article 5.1
of the SPS Agreement.101 The AB recommendation was that the EU bring
the relevant SPS measure into compliance with its obligation under the
agreement.102 In this instance, the AB found the EU at fault for having a
ban was that not been properly created and maintained.
The EU announced that it would comply with the AB report. Despite
its claim of an intention to comply, the EU failed to lift the ban during the
period granted for implementation of the report.103 The EU was unwilling
to lift the ban, as that would have allowed hormone-fed beef into its market.
The EU idea of compliance was to justify its ban. The EU did this by
conducting a risk assessment and passing new legislation that contained a
ban.104 When the EU did not withdraw the ban, the United States and
compliance panels were accurate. For a more in-depth examination of some of the disputes
(Hormones, Bananas III, and FSC). See Impossible Cases, supra note 56.
99 World Trade Org., Request for Consultations by Canada, EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES MEASURES AFFECTING LIVESTOCK AND MEAT (HORMONES) (1996). The results of the U.S.
and Canadian panels in the dispute reached the same results. The appeal combined the
disputes.
100Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Amex 1A, Legal Instruments—
Results of the Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 (1994) [hereinafter SCM Agreement] at
art. 2, 3, 5.
The SPS Agreement sets out the major obligations of Member States in the adoption or
maintenance of sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures. A Member State must ensure that any
SPS measure is necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life, or health, and is based on
scientific principles. A Member State must base its SPS measure on international standards
and guidelines, except where the country intends to provide a higher level of protection. If a
Member State does choose to provide that higher level of protection, it must base its SPS
measure on “an assessment, appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks” to human, animal,
or plant life or health.
101
Hormones AB Report, supra note 4, ¶209.
102Id. ¶¶ 195–209.
103See Impossible Cases, supra note 56, at 365–66.
104See Daniel Wuger, The Never Ending Story: The Implementation Phase in the Dispute
Between the EC and the United States on Hormone-Treated Beef, 33 LAW & POL’Y INT’L
BUS. 777, 806–09 (2002) (describing the pressure on President G.W. Bush to implement
carousel retaliation).
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Canada sought authorization under the terms of Article 22 of the DSU from
the DSB to suspend concessions against the EU.105 In 1999 both countries
were granted the right to suspend concessions—$116.8 million per year for
the United States and $11.3 million per year for Canada.106 Sanctions
began immediately and continued in parallel with negotiations between the
disputants.
Role of Retaliation
There is no evidence that the use of sanctions by the United States and
Canada affected the pace of the EU’s decision about what to do with its
ban. In 2003, after four years of sanctions, the EU announced new
legislation that continued the ban.107 The EU claimed that there was new
scientific evidence justifying the ban and that this measure brought the EC
into compliance.108 The United States and Canada rejected the EU claim of
compliance as well as the EU request that they initiate an Article 21.5
compliance review to resolve the compliance issue.109 The EU sought a
compliance review because a review in its favor would determine that
sanctions should cease. Since the DSU lacked any post-retaliation
procedure dictating the next step in the dispute settlement process, the EU
decided to test the legality of the continued suspension of concessions by
filing a new dispute in 2004.110 The United States and Canadian retaliation,
while not prompting the withdrawal of the ban, did provoke the EU attempt
to resolve the dispute through WTO involvement. The EU argued that the
new dispute, U.S.–Continued Suspension (WT/DS320) was solely about the
proper procedural obligations of Members maintaining retaliation after the
respondent had properly notified its compliance.111

105Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, United States
- Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/7 (Jan. 14,
2005).
106See Impossible Cases, supra note 56, at 368.
107See Council Directive 2003/74, 2003 O.J. (L 262) 17–18 (EC).
108See Communication from the European Communities, European Communities –
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS26/22,
WT/DS48/20, Oct. 28, 2003, Annex 1 (The EC included Council Directive 2003/74 in the
communication to the DSB and stated that “with the publication and entry into force of this
Directive, the EC considers that it has now fully implemented the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB in the aforementioned dispute.”).
109DSB, Minutes of Meeting, 7 November 2003, ¶¶ 28–31, WT/DSB/M/157 (Dec. 18,
2003).
110See Hormones AB report, supra note 4.
111First Written Submission by the European commission, United States – Continued
Suspension of Obligations in the EC—Hormones Dispute, ¶¶ 7, 25, WT/DS320 (July 11,
2005).
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Beyond Retaliation
The Continued Suspension dispute went on from November 2004 until
the issuance of an Appellate Body Report in 2008. The Appellate Body
determined that until the EU was found compliant, the complainants had the
right to continue sanctions.112 As part of its report, the AB designed a
procedure for what should happen after retaliation,113 a procedure not
endorsed by many Member States. The AB determined that not only
respondents but also complainants could initiate Article 21.5 proceedings
for a compliance determination. The Appellate Body found that there was
non-compliance by the EU.114 Consequently, both the United States and
Canada continued to suspend concessions right up until reaching a
negotiated settlement in May 2009.115 By this time, sanctions had been in
place against the EU for a decade.
The negotiated settlement between the disputants came from
consultations that began in December 2008 and culminated in a 2009
Memorandum of Understanding.116 The disputants notified the WTO two
years later of a mutually agreed solution.117 The Beef MOU set out phases.
In the first phase, the EU agreed to expand market access allowing duty free
access for non-hormone-fed beef in return for the U.S. agreements to: (1)
maintain increased duties on a reduced list of products and (2) not impose
new duties under the terms of its carousel retaliation procedure—which
allows the United States to rotate the products that will suffer retaliation. In
the second phase, after three years, duty-free access for beef produced
112Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the
EC-Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008) ¶360 (in so holding it reversed the
panel’s finding that the U.S. was wrong to continue sanctions without recourse to the DSU
process) [hereinafter Continued Suspension ABR].
113Steve Charnovitz, Trade, Investment and Dispute Settlement: The Enforcement of WTO
Judgments, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 558, 564–65 (2009) (describing the decision on this issue as
“remarkable” for filling the DSU gap on what must happen after retaliation).
114See Continued Suspension ABR, supra note 112, ¶¶ 619–20, 734–35.
The AB
reversed the panel holding that the EU had not established that it had removed the ban.
However, the AB also found that it was unable to determine whether the new EU legislation
was in conformance with under the SPS Agreement.
115See USTR Press Release, USTR Announces Agreement with European Union in Beef
Hormones Dispute, USTR (May 8, 2009), available at: http:www.ustr.gov/aboutus/press/office/press-releases/2009/May/ustr-announces-agreement-european-union-beefhormones.
116USTR Press Release, Ambassador Punke Signs Agreement Ensuring Continued Access
of High Quality U.S. Beef to the European Union, USTR (Oct. 21, 2013), available at:
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/blog/2013/October/Punke-US-EU-beef.
117Joint Communication from the European Communities and the United States,
European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS26/28, 30 September 2009. [hereinafter Beef MOU] Joint Communication from the
European Union and Canada, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS48/26 (March 22, 2011).
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without certain hormones would increase and all remaining sanctions would
end.118 The settlement contained an agreement between the disputants to
suspend all further litigation (which would be in the form of an Article 21.5
compliance review) until February of 2011.119 The United States eliminated
all sanctions as of May 2011 and Canada did the same in August 2011.120
The United States and the EU agreed to an extension of the settlement
in October 2013 that would extend through August 2015.121 The 2013
extension allowed importation into the EU of beef from animals not treated
with growth hormones.122 USTR reported that U.S. access to the EU
market because of the earlier agreement would quadruple the value of such
exports before the MOU entered into force.123
The United States continued to monitor the operation of the MOU in
2015 “including with respect to whether the MOU was providing
meaningful market access to U.S. producers.”124 In 2016, the United States
regarded the authorization to impose sanctions from the WTO as still be
available to and announced its willingness to pursue the issue into the WTO
again “[i]f EU implementation and other developments do not proceed as
contemplated. . . .”125 At the end of the Obama administration, USTR
sought public comment on whether the United States should reinstate
sanctions against the EU. The United States extended the comment period
after receiving over 11,000 comments about the possible sanctions.126 The
hormones issue has been a negotiating point between the EU and the United
States in the talks to create a free trade area, the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (T-TIP).127 The T-TIP negotiations have not made
118Beef

MOU, supra note 117, at Annex, Art. 1.
at Annex, Art. 7.
120USTR Ends Duties on EU Goods Related to Beef Hormones Dispute, 28 Int’l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 904 (June 2, 2011); Canada Repeals Surtax on EU Products in Compensation
for Beef Hormones Dispute, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1387 (Aug. 25, 2011).
121Joint Communication from the European Union and the United States, European
Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/29
(Apr. 17, 2014) at Art. V.
122Jalissa Nugent, U.S., EU Sign Agreement Extending Hormone-Free U.S. Beef Imports,
30 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1642 (Oct. 24, 2013).
123Id.
124Trade Policy Agenda 2016 and 2015 Annual Report, USTR 1, 182 (2016),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/reports-and-publications/2016/2016trade-policy-agenda-and-2015-Annual-Report.
125Id.
126Brian Flood, Stampede of Comments about the U.S.-EU Beef Dispute Hits Trade Rep.,
34 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 367 (March 2, 2017)(two beef industry groups support the
reintroduction of sanctions arguing that U.S. beef has not benefitted enough from the quota
and that dialogue with the EU is “going nowhere.”).
127See website of the United States Trade Representative for what it is sharing about TTIP, https://ustr.gov/ttip.
119Id.
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progress in the early days of the Trump administration.128 If the United
States re-imposes sanctions, this will mark the first time that a settlement of
a WTO dispute has failed.
Legacy to the system
The Hormones dispute started a pattern that would repeat in the many
of the cases of sustained non-compliance: the respondent claims compliance
without delivering it and pursues additional WTO arbitration instead of
removing the offending measure. The EU has never lifted the ban found to
be in violation of the SPS Agreement. Because of the Continued
Suspension dispute and the ad hoc settlements afterwards, there has never
been a DSB determination of compliance by the EU.
The ad hoc settlements reveal another pattern—they fail the DSU
requirement for a legal mutually agreed solution under the DSU129 (that any
settlement be consistent with WTO agreements). What the disputants
agreed to in the Hormones dispute is what Alschner describes as an
“interim settlement” in which the disputants agree to a solution that will
later be notified to the WTO as a mutually agreed solution.130 To date there
has been no notification of a mutually agreed solution to the DSB. In 2017,
two decades after the dispute began, the goal of the EU continues to be to
keep all hormone-fed beef out of the EU market131 and the interim
settlement could break down in favor of a return to sanctions.

128Rosella Brevetti, EU, U.S. Tout Trade Talks’ Progress, See Way Forward, 34 Int’l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 110 (Jan. 19, 2017). See also Casey Wooten, Brexit May Hurt
Agriculture Trade Gains from T-TIP, Report Says, 33 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1031 (July 21,
2016) (citing to a Congressional Research Service report noting that non-tariff barriers such
as the beef hormone issue have been part of the T-TIP negotiations).
By contrast, Canada has settled its part of the Hormones dispute with the EU. Canada and
the EU notified the DSB of a settlement reached as part of the completion of the free trade
agreement between the two. See Andy Hoffman & Bryce Baschuk, EU Canada End
Decades-Old Spat Over Hormone Treated Meat, 34 Int’l Trade Rep (BNA) 1354 (Oct. 12,
2017).
129See Alschner, supra note 52, at 74 (listing the Hormones dispute as one involving an
interim settlement).
130The WTO website describes the extension of the Beef MOU entered into by the
disputants in 2009 as a “Mutually acceptable solution on implementation.” See European
Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO (Sep. 25,
2009), www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds26_e.htm. (There is no such term in
the DSU, which only speaks of the “mutually agreed solution.”).
131Michael Scaturro, EU Seeks Exemptions from Tariff Cuts for Poultry, Dairy, 33 Int’l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 201 (Feb. 11, 2016).
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EU: Bananas III (WT/DS 27)
Basis for Dispute
The EU triggered the Bananas III dispute in 1993 by adopting a
harmonized policy regarding banana imports.132 The banana regime—which
operated through a complex, tariff, quota and licensing system—limited the
access of South American bananas to the EU market in favor of bananas
from former EU colonies: African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.133 The
United States got involved in the dispute when a U.S. producer, Chiquita,
filed a Section 301 petition arguing that the banana regime and its
framework agreement violated the GATT.134 The United States along with
affected South American countries negotiated with the EU. After these
negotiations failed in 1998, the United States, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Mexico filed the dispute. The panel135 and AB reports136
both concluded that the banana regime violated GATT, the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Import Licensing
Agreements.137 The biggest difference between the two reports was that the
AB report rejected the panel’s broad reading of the EU’s waiver of WTO
rules, the Lomé Convention (which allowed for preferential treatment for
developing countries).138 The AB determined that the Lomé Waiver—
which the EU had obtained to excuse its violations—covered only claims of
Article I (Most Favored Nation) violations but not claims relating to Article
XIII (Allocation of Quotas).139 The AB report rejected the banana import
regime. The disputants negotiated but the United States rejected a
temporary compensation offer.140 The EU was given ten months (until
January 1999) to comply with the DSB recommendation. The EU response,
132Council Regulation 404/93 on the Common Organization of the Market in Bananas,
1993 O.J. (L 47) 1 (EC).
133See F. Weiss, Manifestly Illegal Import Restrictions and Non-compliance with WTO
Dispute Settlement Rulings, TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC DISPUTES 121, 123 (Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2003) (discussing the claims and results in Bananas I, II
and III) [hereinafter Weiss].
134See Disclosure to Investors in Systemwide and Consolidated Bank Debt Obligations of
the Farm Credit System, 59 Fed. Reg. 5341 (proposed Feb. 4, 1994) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 630) (responding to the Section 301 petition); see also Shaffer, supra note 58 at
23–24 (discussing U.S. support for Chiquita Brands’ opposition to the EC banana licensing
regime).
135Panel Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/R/USA (adopted May 22, 1997) [hereinafter
Bananas III Panel].
136Bananas III AB Report, supra note 4, at ¶ 132.
137Id. at ¶ 203.
138Id. at ¶¶ 184–88.
139Id.
140See Impossible Cases, supra note 56, at 350.
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over objections, was to approve a new banana import regime in 1998.141
The U.S. moved under Article 22 to suspend concessions for the EU’s
failure to comply.
What happened next in the dispute was a series of negotiations
between the disputants over how to proceed with the dispute. This was
required because the DSU had a gap—it lacked a process for how
disputants should move forward when there was a dispute over compliance.
At issue was whether the complainant should seek a compliance review or
can go straight to the DSB to authorize retaliation for non-compliance. This
dispute produced the first major procedural battle in the WTO over the
terms of the DSU. The EU and Ecuador filed Article 21.5 compliance
reviews.142 The United States took the position that it had the right to seek
the suspension of concessions. The arguments over “sequencing”—the
name given to dilemma created by the DSU gap—were resolved in a
compromise negotiated by the WTO Director General.
The DSB suspended the U.S. request for retaliation pending an EU
agreement to arbitrate over what would be an appropriate level of
arbitration.143 Ultimately, there was one Article 21.5 report written to cover
the issues of whether there had been compliance and whether to authorize
retaliation.144 This report found the EU’s second banana regime to be noncompliant and the panel placed the suspension of concessions at $191.4
million per year.145 The Article 21.5 panel refused to determine what would
be the proper “sequencing” of procedural steps and stated that the issue
belonged to the WTO itself for consideration in the DSU review process.146
Role of Retaliation
Following the compliance report, the EU failed to produce a revised
version of the banana regime.147 The United States responded by
implementing its sanctions authorization in 1999.148
Ecuador also
141See

Weiss, supra note 133, at 130.

142Id.
143Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, European
Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc.
WT/DS27/40 (Dec. 15, 1998). Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU, European Communities
- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/41
(Dec. 18, 1998).
144See Mauricio Salas & John H. Jackson, Procedural Overview of the WTO EC –
Banana Dispute, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 145, 165 (2000) [hereinafter Salas & Jackson].
145Panel Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/RW/ECU (adopted Apr. 12, 1999).
146Id. See WTO Banana Arbitrators Find for U.S. on Procedure, Substance, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Apr. 9, 1999.
147Impossible Cases, supra note 56, at 353.
148Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., Europe Agree to Begin New Talks on Bananas, Beef Hormones
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proceeded under Article 22 and received DSB authorization to suspend
concessions under the GATS and Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights Agreements by establishing that the traditional retaliation
available—retaliation in trade in goods—was “impracticable and
ineffective.”149 Ecuador conducted subsequent negotiations with the EU
armed with the threat of this cross-retaliation.150 The United States imposed
sanctions for two years until it negotiated an understanding with the EU that
provided for the U.S. suspension of retaliation in exchange for an EU
adoption of a new banana regulation.151 Left out of the talks about the U.S.EU settlement, Ecuador negotiated a settlement with the EU. The two
settlements went to the DSB as mutually agreed solutions.152 The EU
agreed to abandon quotas and go only to tariffs regarding bananas by
2006.153 Until the new system could come into effect—from July 2001
through December 2005—the EU could continue using the tariff and quota
system as long as it reflected the actual market shares of the affected
countries.154 The settlement left in place the GATT inconsistencies and
required two waivers from the WTO membership to allow it to go
forward.155 Retaliation appears to have driven the speed—two years—with
Within Week, Int’l Trade Daily (BNA), April 20, 1999.
149See also Salas & Jackson, supra note 144, at 161–62 (providing an explanation of the
request Ecuador made to the DSB).
150Recourse of Ecuador to Article 22.2 of the DSU, European Communities - Regime for
the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/52 (Nov. 9, 1999).
See also Salas & Jackson, supra note 144, at 156–57 and 161–62 (providing an explanation
of the request Ecuador made to the DSB).
151See James McCall Smith, Compliance Bargaining in the WTO: Ecuador and the
Bananas Dispute, NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND NAFTA,
257–86 (John S. Odell ed., 2006) [hereinafter Smith]. Smith contends that Ecuador greatly
improved the results of the Bananas III dispute in its favor by going its own way on the
sequencing issue. Id. at 267. Ecuador was also successful because it carefully selected the
TRIPs retaliation to hit the EU Members the most resistant to changing the banana regime.
Id. at 270.
152U.S.-EU Banana Agreement, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Apr. 13, 2001, at 20. See John H.
Jackson & Patricio Grane, The Saga Continues: An Update on the Banana Dispute and Its
Procedural Offspring, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 581, 588–89 (2001) (discussing the agreement by
which Ecuador was still bound); see also Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, The
U.S.-EU Banana Agreement: Frequently Asked Questions (Apr. 11, 2001) (on file with the
author).
153Both understandings were submitted by the EC to the DSB as a mutually agreed
solution to the dispute. Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, European Communities ––
Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/58
(July 2, 2001).
154See Impossible Cases, supra note 56, at 355.
155Press Release, Council of the European Union, European Union Adopts New “TariffOnly’ Import Regime for Bananas from 1 January 2006 (Nov. 29, 2005),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-05-1493_en.htm). The EU countries were in sharp
disagreement about the tariff level to set for the new import regime. Seven countries, led by

82

Taylor_jci2 (Do Not Delete)

12/5/2017 4:12 PM

Beyond Retaliation
38:55 (2017)

which the EU sought and achieved settlement of a dispute that had started
four years earlier.156 The United States chose for its retaliation 100% tariff
increases on nine non-agricultural products coming from the EU member
countries that had continued to support the banana regime.157 The
imposition of these tariffs caused large losses and lost market share for the
UK and France.158
Beyond Retaliation
The 2001 mutually agreed solutions failed to resolve all of the issues
between the disputants. In late 2006, the United States challenged the EU
revision of the banana regime (done to meet the 2006 deadline for the new
system) as GATT-inconsistent and filed to join the consultations Ecuador
has started for an Article 21.5 compliance review.159 The United States
sought an Article 21.5 compliance review in June 2007.160 The Article 21.5
panel and AB reports found the EU regime to be inconsistent with DSB
recommendations.161 The disputants carried negotiations over what would
constitute compliance into negotiations at the 2008 WTO Ministerial
Conference but still failed to reach an agreement.162 The EU and Latin
Germany, argued that the tariff was set too high. See Bananas | Tariffs: EU Imposes, WTO
to Rule, Latin American Caribbean & Central America Report, Dec. 2005, at 7.
156See Impossible Cases, supra note 56, at 354.
157See Scott D. Andersen & Justine Blanchett, The United States’ Experience and
Practice in Suspending WTO Obligations, THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF
RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 238, 238–39 (Chad P. Brown & Joost Pauwelyn
eds., 2010).
158Id. at 238.
159Request to Join Consultations by the United States, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by Ecuador, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/76 (Dec. 13, 2006). See also Summary,
DS27: European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas
(Nov.
20,
2012),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds27_e.htm.
160Request for the Establishment of a Panel, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the
United States, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/83 (July 2, 2007).
161Panel Report, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, European
Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 7.720, WTO
Doc. WT/DS27/RW/USA (May 19, 2008); Appellate Body Reports, Second Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador and Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United
States, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, para. 354, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU and WT/DS27/AN/RW/USA
(Nov. 26, 2008).
162Daniel Pruzin, EU, Latin Nations Formally Sign Agreement on Bananas; First Tariff
Cut Takes Place, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 828 (June 3, 2012) at 1 [hereinafter PruzinGATB]; Geneva Agreement on Trade in Bananas, May 31, 2010 available as an attachment
to Agreement on Trade in Bananas Between the United States and the EU, June 8, 2010
[hereinafter US/EU/Bananas]. The text of the two agreements are available at
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American countries continued negotiations until they achieved a settlement
in May 2010—the Geneva Agreement on Trade in Bananas163 (GATB).
The GATB covered meaningful market access in the form of much lower
tariffs for not only the eleven Latin American countries involved in those
negotiations but also other MFN suppliers.164 The EU Parliament signed
off on the GATB in February 2011.165 The disputants designed the GATB
to produce a steady decline in tariff rates until a new final rate in 2017.166
The EU agreed that it would: (1) maintain a non-discriminatory, tariff-only
regime for the importation of bananas; and (2) not reintroduce measures to
discriminate among banana distributors based on ownership or control of
the distributors or the source of the bananas.167
The Bananas III dispute and its ultimate resolution dragged on for 14
years before the GATB became the solution. During that time there was a
continuous series of comments from many members about the sustained
non-compliance168 making it one of the top three disputes in WTO history
to generate negative comments at DSB surveillance meetings. Bananas III
illustrates the limits of what developing country complainants can achieve.
Ecuador “won” the disputeand the right to use cross-retaliationbut still
settled the dispute after losing effective access to the world’s largest banana
market.169
Legacy for the system
The Bananas III dispute revealed, and then as a practical matter dealt
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-official/press-releases/2010/june-us-eu-sign-agreementdesigned-settle-bananas-dispute.
163See Len Bracken, U.S., EU Agree to Settle Dispute Over Latin American Bananas,
USTR Says, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 856 (June 10, 2010); GATB, supra, at p. 4 (the
GATB represents the EU’s final market access commitment for bananas in the Doha Round
negotiations.).
164See Pruzin-GATB, supra note 162, at 2.
165Joe Kirwin, EU Parliament Backs Banana Trade Deal With Latin America to Reduce
Tariffs, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 224 (Feb. 10, 2011).
166See US/EU/Bananas, supra note 162, at p. 2.
167Id.
168Rhetoric of Legitimacy, supra note 66, at 14, n.24. The Bananas III dispute provoked
971 statements by 47 Member States. Id. at 14, n.24 and 19. This dispute, along with the
U.S.-Section 211 Appropriations Act and the Byrd Amendment disputes are the three disputes
that account for almost half of the statements made by WTO Member States from 2005 to
2013. Id.
169Johannesson & Mavroidis, supra note 25, at 22 (“Did Ecuador win though? For
Ecuador, trade in bananas represents a substantial percentage of its GDP . . . , and EU one of
its most lucrative markets. Well, it lost the EU market for more than twenty years, since the
EU changed its policy only in 2011. Ecuador never received any compensation for the loss
of the trade during these years, and, wisely, did not make matters worse for it by imposing
countermeasures, as it could against the EU.”).
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with, one gap revealed in the DSU: the “sequencing” problem. Negotiating
a solution over how to proceed when the triggering events occur has
become the practice in all later DSU disputes involving Articles 21 and
22.170 It has also become the proposal in the DSU reform negotiations to
fill this DSU gap. The Bananas III dispute also involved the first
consideration and authorization of cross-retaliation as well as the first
decision to refrain from using that authorization. Most importantly, the
Bananas III dispute is notable because the disputants sought a WTO waiver
for a mutually agreed solution. To this extent, the dispute provides a model
for how the DSB and thus the WTO should be involved in settlements
where there has been a problem with sustained non-compliance. In most of
the other disputes going to retaliation and beyond, the disputants have
negotiated interim settlements that do not satisfy the WTO requirements.
U.S.: Foreign Sales Corporation
Basis for the Dispute
The Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) dispute (WT/DS108) began in
1998 when the EU challenged the U.S. tax treatment of foreign earned
income as a prohibited export subsidy.171 As in Hormones and Bananas III,
there had been prior disputes under the GATT about essentially the same
practice.172 The EU pursued the case when it did—coming right after the
two earlier disputes—as a response to the perceived aggressive action by
the United States173 in the other disputes.
Both the panel and the AB found that the FSC exemption to be an
export-contingent subsidy that violated Article 3.1(a) of the Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures Agreement.174 The U.S. options for compliance
were to either eliminate or revise the FSC program. The U.S. response was
170Guohua, Mercurio & Yongjie, supra note 42, at 273-274 (“[N]on-compliance cases
arising after EC—Bananas are forced to proceed through ‘voluntary understandings’ to
negotiate around the textual shortcomings.”). See also Zimmermann, supra note 74, at 150.
Negotiating a solution to the sequencing problem has been an issue in the DSU reform
negotiations. According to Zimmermann, Members viewed this as a “less acute” problem
“in light of the practice to conclude bilateral agreements which has developed.” Id. For a
description of the terms of these bilateral agreements generally work see id. at 150-51. For
an example of one of these negotiated agreements on sequencing see Understanding
Between the United States and Canada Regarding Procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the
DSU, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements,
WT/DS/384/23 (June 13, 2013).
171See Impossible Cases, supra note 56, at 409.
172Id. at 405–09.
173Id. at 409.
174Panel Report, United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations, ¶ 7.130,
WTO Doc. WT/DS108/R (Oct. 8, 1999) [hereinafter FSC Panel]; U.S.-FSC, supra note 4, ¶
90.
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to pass in less than a year the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income
Exclusion Act (ETI Act). The United States argued that the ETI Act
brought it into argued compliance with the DSB recommendation. There
was, in fact, little basis for the U.S. claim as the new statute kept major
aspects of the FSC system in place. By appearing to comply, however, the
United States did achieve a delay in having to comply fully. The EU
challenged the new legislation in an Article 21.5 compliance review and the
panel and the AB found the new statute flawed.175
Role of Retaliation
Following this two-year litigation process over this solution to the
original dispute, the EU sought authorization to retaliate against the United
States. The EU received DSB authorization to suspend concessions at just
over $4 million per year.176 The EU chose to wait and make strategic use of
the retaliation authorization. The EU targeted the tariff increases to hit
products from states whose U.S. Congress members,177 regarded as
responsible for passing legislation that might satisfy the findings of the
WTO AB report. The EU picked products for the tariff increases from
states in play for the reelection campaign of President G.W. Bush. Within
the year, Congress passed the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (JOBS
Act).178 The JOBS Act eliminated the ETI and any attempt at keeping
foreign sales corporations. The JOBS Act instead provided all U.S
corporations manufacturing in the United States with a ten percent tax
reduction.179
However, the U.S. attempt to resolve the dispute was not without
flaws. The JOBS ACT contained a transition period over to the new tax
code that allowed the SCM-illegal subsidies to remain in place for a time.180
175Impossible

Cases, supra note 56, at 413–14.
EC sought an Article 22.6 arbitration decision about the amount of the sanctions.
See Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article
4.11 of the SCM Agreement, United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales
Corporations, ¶ A.34, WTO Doc. WT/DS108/ARB (Aug. 30, 2002) (“In these
circumstances, we find that the amount of $4, 043 million, which falls between the range of
values calculated on the basis of the parties’ respective methodologies can be considered to
be a reasonable approximation of the actual subsidy for the year 2000.”). The DSB then
granted the authorization to impose sanctions in May 2003. WTO Set to Authorize EU on
May 7 to Impose Trade Sanctions Against U.S. in Tax Dispute, 20 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA)
751 (May 1. 2003).
177
Impossible Cases, supra note 56, at 414–15.
178American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004)
[hereinafter Jobs Act]; Id. at §101-02.
179Id. at §101(d), (f).
180See Paul Meller, European Trade Chief Says Sanctions on U.S. Will End, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 2004, at C2 (noting that the EC trade commissioner “balked” at the transitioning
provisions). According to Meller, “[t]he legislation allows the United States to give $4
176The
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The EU responded to this continuation of the illegal conduct by making
plans to withdraw the sanctions and challenging the U.S. actions in an
Article 21.5 compliance review. Putting a transition period in the JOBS
Act not only contravened the U.S. obligation under the original AB report
but also Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, which requires WTO members
to withdraw prohibited subsidies immediately.181
When challenged, the United States focused most of its arguments
during the panel and AB compliance reviews on the nature of Article 21 of
the DSU and Art. 4.7 of the SCM Agreement rather than on a defense of the
JOBS Act.182 Both the reports completed in 2005 and 2006 rejected all U.S.
arguments.183 The AB report determined that: (1) the United States had
failed to meet its earlier obligation to comply; (2) it had not withdrawn all
prohibited subsidies; and (3) it remained under an obligation to remove the
subsidies.184 Facing a threat by the EU to reintroduce the sanctions,
Congress passed and the President signed in May of the 2006, the Tax
Increase and Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, which repealed the
transition periods. The EU responded by dropping its plans to reintroduce
the sanctions.185 The sanctions, both in regard to how they were used to
leverage the U.S. political process and as a threat when the United States
stalled compliance, forced Congress to focus on the passage of
implementing legislation to resolve the dispute.
Beyond Retaliation
Unlike the earlier disputes between the United States and the EU, the
FSC dispute ended in a complete victory for the complainant. Nevertheless,
the dispute introduced new patterns for how a disputant could game
compliance. The United States extended the time it got for coming into
compliance to six years by passing not one but two SCM-illegal legislative
reforms and then litigating over whether each one constituted a true attempt
billion, or 80 percent of the amount distributed under the [FSC] program, to American
companies [in 2005]. In 2006 this will fall to $3 billion, or 60 percent.”
181See Impossible Cases, supra note 56, at 416.
182Panel Report, Second Recourse to Article 21.5 by the European Communities, United
States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, ¶ 6.14, WTO Doc.
WT/DS108/RW2 [hereinafter Art. 21.5 II Panel Report]; Appellate Body Report, Second
Recourse to Article 21.5 by the European Communities, United States - Tax Treatment for
“Foreign Sales Corporations”, ¶ 20-27, WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/RW2 (Feb. 13, 2006)
[hereinafter Art. 21.5 II AB Report].
183Art. 21.5 II Panel Report, supra note 182, at ¶ 7.87 and 8.1; Art. 21.5 II AB Report,
supra note 182, at ¶ 100.
184Art. 21.5 II AB Report, supra note 182, at ¶ 100.
185Rory Watson, Repeal Heals US-EU Rift, LONDON TIMES, May 13, 2006, at 54 (“The
European Commission confirmed that it would now shelve the sanctions which it was
preparing to introduce against US exports . . . .”).
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to comply.
Legacy for the system
The dispute also marks an effective use of strategic retaliation by the
EU. The FSC dispute also saw the introduction of the practice of passing
legislation to comply that only appeared to be compliant. This “appear to
comply while buying time” strategy proved effective in getting the United
States additional time (five years) to comply.
Brazil/Canada: Regional Aircraft (WT/DS 46, 70 & 222)
Basis for the Dispute
The dispute between Canada and Brazil involved competing claims
about illegal subsidization of regional aircraft—an industry that had been
producing more planes and taking a larger percentage of flights from the
1970s through the 1990s.186 In 1996, Canada filed the first complaint,
WT/DS46 accusing Brazil of offering prohibited export subsidies in the
form of a government-backed financing program.187 Brazil responded with
its own complaint in 1997 arguing that Canadian federal and provincial
subsidies to regional aircraft producers were also export subsidies in
violation of Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement.188 Both disputes failed to
resolve in consultations and went to the panel level. Two panel reports
addressing the competing claims were issued on the same day in April
1999.189 Canada successfully established that almost all of the Brazilian
subsidies were export subsidies.190 Brazil was also successful regarding its
claims of export subsidization.191 The Appellate Body reports issued in
August 1999 largely upheld the panel’s findings that each country had
provided prohibited export subsidies. Under the terms of the SCM
Agreement, prohibited subsidies must be withdrawn immediately.
Consequently, the AB reports in each dispute provided the respondent with
186See

Helena D. Sullivan, Regional Jet Trade Wars: Politics and Compliance in WTO
Dispute Resolution, 12 MINN. J. GLOB. 71, 74 (2003) [hereinafter Sullivan] for a description
of the regional jet market.
187Request for Consultations, Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WTO
Doc. WT/DS46/1 (June 19, 1996).
188Request for Consultations by Brazil, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of
Civilian Aircraft, WTO Doc. WT/DS70/1 (March 10, 1997).
189Panel Report, Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WTO Doc.
WT/DS46/R (Apr. 14, 1999); Panel Report, Canada- Measures Affecting the Export of
Civilian Aircraft, WTO Doc. WT/DS70/R (Apr. 14, 1999).
190Panel Report, Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, supra note 189, at ¶
8.1.
191Panel Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, supra note
170, at ¶ 10.1.
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ninety days in which to remove the subsidies.192
By November of 1999, Canada announced that it had complied and it
requested an Article 21.5 compliance review for Brazil. Brazil, in turn,
filed a request for a compliance review.193 The panel194 reviews found that
neither country had altered their subsidies programs to bring them into line
with SCM requirements. Even before the AB 21.5 ruling, Canada sought
authorization for retaliation that would cover not only aircraft but also trade
in goods and rights under the Import Licensing and Textile and Clothing
Agreements.195 The AB 21.5 compliance review for Brazil found that the
measures it took to comply were not consistent with the SCM.196 By
contrast, the AB 21.5 compliance review for Canada determined that Brazil
had failed to prove that the revised Canadian subsidy program was
inconsistent with the SCM Agreement.197
Role of Retaliation
Both countries tried to resolve the dispute through negotiations in
order to avoid having to seek or use retaliation. However, those
negotiations broke down in June 2000.198 In August 2000, an Article 22.6
panel gave Canada the right to retaliate at the level of $344.2 Canadian
dollars for six years.199 Brazil took additional measures to revise its exportfinancing program and argued that its third variation PROEX III brought it
into compliance. Canada sought a second compliance review. The 21.5
compliance review panel determined in July 2001 that while on its face
PROEX III seemed consistent with the requirements of the SCM
Agreement,200 it was not in a position to determine whether application of
PROEX III would be compliant.201
192Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WTO
Doc. WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999) at ¶ 196; Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures
Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WTO Doc. WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999) at ¶
220.
193See Sullivan, supra note 185, at 84.
194Recourse to Article 21.5, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WTO
Doc. WT/DS46/RW (May 9, 2000) at ¶ 7.1-7.3; Recourse to Article 21.5, Canada C
Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WTO Doc. WT/DS79/RW (May 9, 2000)
at ¶ 6.1-6.3.
195See Sullivan, supra note 185, at 87.
196Recourse to Article 21.5 (AB), Brazil.
197Recourse to Article 21.5 (AB); Canada C Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft, WTO Doc. WT/DS70/AB/RW (July 21, 2000) at ¶ 53.
198See Sullivan, supra note 186, at 88.
199Recourse to Article 22.6 Arbitration, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for
Aircraft, WTO Doc. WT/DS46/ARB (Aug. 28, 2000).
200Panel Report, Second Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, Brazil – Export
Financing Programme for Aircraft, ¶ VI.324, WTO DOC. WT/DS46/RW/2 (July 26, 2001).
201Id. at ¶ VI.325-VI.326 (providing Canada with the right to challenge any future
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Shortly before Canada sought the second compliance review, Brazil
filed a request for consultations on a new dispute, WT/DS222, accusing
Canada again of export subsidies in the form of export credits and loan
guarantees to the regional aircraft industry.202 The panel report issued in
January 2002 found against Canada on three of the claims of loan
guarantees as export subsidies.203 Canada chose not to appeal the decision
against it. Brazil sought the right to retaliate when Canada failed to remove
the identified export subsidies within ninety days. The two countries
announced a settlement the next month, but Brazil quickly threatened to
request authorization to suspend concessions for $3.6 billion.204 When
Canada objected, Brazil followed the Article 22 procedure of seeking
arbitration over the amount of retaliation. In February 2003, the Article 22.6
report authorized a trade in goods retaliation of approximately $247.8
million.205
The two countries reported to the DSB that they would intensify
efforts to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution in order to forestall the
use of retaliation.206 Brazil, like Canada, never used its authorization to
retaliate. The countries instead focused their energies on adopting a new
version of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) voluntary rules on use of government export credits to support
aircraft sales.207 The Sector Understanding on Export Credits for Civil
Aircraft208 addressed many of the issues the two countries had litigated in
the series of WTO disputes.209 Although not a member of the OECD,
Brazil chose to participate in the negotiations and sign the agreements as
part of its attempt to end the dispute.210
application of the PROEX III program).
202Request for Consultations, Canada – Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for
Regional Aircraft, WTO DOC. WT/DS222/1 (Jan. 22, 2001).
203Panel Report, Canada – Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft, ¶
8.1, WTO DOC. WT/DS222/R (Jan. 28, 2002).
204See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Gives Brazil Green Light to Impose Sanctions in Canadian
Aircraft Dispute, 20 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 564 (March 27, 2008).
205Recourse to Arbitration by Canada under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Art. 4.11 of the
SCM Agreement, Canada – Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft,
WTO Doc. WT/DS222/ARB (Feb. 17, 2003). The arbitrator authorized Brazil to suspend of
concessions of $247,797,000. Id. at para. 4.1.
206Id.
207See Lawrence J. Speer, Brazil Joins Updated OECD Pact on Export Credits for Civil
Aviation, 24 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA)1107 (Aug. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Speer].
208OECD,
Sector Understanding on Export Credits for Civil Aircraft,
TAD/PG(2007)4/FINAL(July
27,
2007),
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=tad/pg(2007)4/FIN
AL&doclanguage=en.
209Speer, supra note 206, at 1107.
210Id.
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Legacy for the System
The resolution of the regional aircraft dispute illustrates the reality
facing most WTO disputants—WTO authorization of retaliation is too
expensive and harmful to employ. With the WTO option for resolution
removed, the disputants shifted to another forum to arrange a settlement
over the underlying legal issues.
United States: Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (WT/DS 136 & 162)
Basis for the Dispute
The EU211 brought the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (WT/DS136)
dispute in 1998 to try to force the United States to repeal the statute. The
1916 Act was made a part of antitrust law212 and provided a private right of
action for relief from “any person importing . . . any articles . . . into the
United States . . . at a price substantially less than the actual market value or
wholesale price . . . at the time of exportation to the United States . . . .”213
The 1916 Act allowed for treble damages for violations. The 1916 Act,
however, also required the plaintiff to prove not only the act of dumping 214
but also a predatory intent to dump. Because of the latter, the statute was
underused. Soon after passing the statute, Congress created another way to
police anti-dumping through the imposition of tariffs on imports. It is the
second system, which forms the basis for the current version on antidumping law in the United States,215 that was revised in 1998. The United
States did not eliminate the 1916 Act at that time even though it satisfied
none of the GATT and Anti-Dumping Agreement limitations on such a
211The EU brought the first dispute (WT/DS136); Japan brought another dispute
(WT/DS162). The two disputes were heard separately but before the same panel.
21215 U.S.C. § 72 (2000).
213Id. The full text of the act is available in the panel report for the first dispute. Panel
Report, United States –Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, ¶ 2.1, WTO DOC. WT/DS136/R (March
31, 2000) (panel finding for the EU against the U.S.) [hereinafter Panel Report DS/136].
214See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 221 F.3d 924, 925 n. l (6th Cir.
2000) (citing 15 U.S.C. §72).
215The United States amended its anti-dumping law after the Uruguay Round to bring it
into compliance with the WTO’s new Anti-Dumping Agreement. See 19 U.S.C. § 3501
(2000); H.R. Rep. No. 103–826, at 22–23 (1994) (reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773.
Under Article VI of the GATT, Members are allowed to have statutes to protect against the
unfair practice of dumping (transnational price discrimination) if dumping is proven and the
country imposing a remedy requires a showing that a domestic industry has been injured by
dumping. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, at Art. VI:1 [hereinafter GATT]. The Antidumping Agreement was adopted in
1994 to provide further guidance on how antidumping procedures had to operate to be in
compliance with GATT Article VI. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade –
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round); Agreements on Trade in Goods, Dec.
15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 28 (1994).
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trade action. While underused, some parties did file actions under the 1916
Act, and these triggered the disputes filed by the EU and Japan.
Panel and Appellate Body reports in 2000 found that the United States
had violated both Article VI of the GATT and the Antidumping Agreement
by maintaining the 1916 Act.216 The United States was given a ten-month
period to repeal the 1916 Act.217 The United States announced its intent to
go to Congress for the necessary repeal. The United States asked and
received an extension of time to take action, but by the end of 2001, it still
had not withdrawn the Act. The EU, along with Japan,218 sought
authorization in January 2002 to suspend concessions.
Role of Retaliation
In February 2002, the disputants suspended an Article 22.6 arbitration
over the appropriate amount of concessions with the understanding that the
sanctions would be reactivated if the United States failed to make
substantial progress towards compliance. The EU gave the United States
until September of 2003 before it did reactivate the arbitration. In early
2004, the 22.6 arbitrator found for the EU.219 Usually requests for
retaliation focus on the appropriate amount of sanctions in light of the
injury caused by the non-compliant measure. The 1916 Act dispute,
however, involved a facial attack on the statute rather than its application.
The 22.6 arbitrator thus chose to focus on the damages paid by EU
companies coming from judgments under the 1916 Act and any settlements
between an EU and U.S. company.220
Before the year was out and before any retaliation, Congress repealed
the 1916 Act in November of 2004.221 There is little doubt that a viable
threat of retaliation persuaded Congress to repeal. Until the threat was
available, the United States delayed responding to the AB report and DSB
recommendation through negotiations and promises of action while keeping
216See Panel Report DS/136/R, supra note 213; Panel Report, United States – AntiDumping Act of 1916, WTO DOC. WT/DS/162/R (May 29, 2000) (finding for Japan). The
two panel reports were reviewed together in one Appellate Body report. See Appellate Body
Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WTO DOC. WT/DS136/AB/R,
WT/DS162/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000). The Appellate Body affirmed the Panel determinations
that the 1916 Act violated both Article VI:1 of the GATT and the Anti-Dumping Agreement
for providing anti-dumping relief in a form not allowed by the GATT or the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. Id.
217
The United States sought and was granted the ten months to comply under an Article
21.3 arbitration. See DSU, supra note 14, at art. 21.3.
218See infra note 221 (discussing Japan’s role in the case).
219Decision by the Arbitrators, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WTO DOC.
WT/DS136/ARB (Feb. 24, 2004).
220Id.
221Act of Dec. 3, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–429, 118 Stat. 2434, § 2006(a).
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the statute in play for four years after the issuance of the AB report. The
repeal of the statute did not bring relief to all parties affected, as it was
prospective only—leaving in place any cases and possible judgments won
under the Antidumping Act of 1916 that were initiated before November
2004.222 Japan responded by passing a statute that authorized “Japanese
parties against whom a judgment was issued under the 1916 Act . . . to
recover the full amount of the judgment, interest, and expenses.”223
Legacy for the system
The 1916 Act dispute illustrates the pattern developed in earlier
disputes: the respondent uses both the settlement negotiations and promises
to comply as methods for gaining additional time to comply. One aspect of
the dispute’s resolution was unique, though; the United States offered a
measure to comply aimed at offering prospective relief only to the traders
impacted by the GATT-illegal statute.
U.S.: Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Byrd
Amendment)
Basis for Dispute
Congress passed the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of
2000 (best known by its proponent Sen. Byrd) with the knowledge that it
could provoke an attack in the WTO DSU system.224 The Byrd Amendment
awarded cash payments to domestic firms that brought and prevailed in
dumping and countervailing duty actions against importers. Normally when
a domestic industry brings and wins these unfair trade actions, the U.S.
government imposes tariffs on the imports. The tariffs go to the U.S.
Treasury while the industry receives what is supposed to be a level playing
field that makes it competitive against imports that have been subsidized or
dumped.225 The Byrd Amendment went further than standard practice by
222Japan has complained of one of its companies being hit by a treble damages finding
after the DSB recommendation that the U.S. remove the measure but before the repeal. The
United States contends the repeal has brought it into compliance. Toshio Aritake, Japan’s
Trade Barriers Report Cites U.S. For Byrd, Dumping, Buy American Measures, 26 Int’l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 744 (June 4, 2009).
223Id.
224See Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law, 92
VA. L. REV. 251, 269–70 (2006) (noting that Senator Byrd attached the amendment to an
agricultural appropriations bill “knowing it would violate international trade law, but also
knowing that the bill was too politically import for the president to veto”). President Clinton
signed the agriculture appropriations bill containing the Byrd Amendment even though he
opposed this particular trade measure. Id. at 270.
225For a description of how the anti-dumping and countervailing duties work, see Cong.
Budget Office, Letter in Response to Request for Economic Analysis Of The Continued
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providing that the tariff revenues gained from the import relief actions
should go directly to the industries, thus arguably over-protecting the
industries filing for trade relief.
Two groups of countries filed complaints seeking DSU consultations
just months after the passage of the legislation. In the first complaint
Australia, Brazil, Chile, the EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea and
Thailand filed a joint complaint (WT/DS 217). The second joint complaint
was filed by Canada and Mexico (WT/DS 234). Both sets of complaints
alleged that the Byrd Amendment violated both the Antidumping and SCM
Agreements.226 When consultations failed, all eleven countries asked for a
panel.
Both the panel227 and the Appellate Body228 found against the United
States.229 After the DSB adopted the AB report and its recommendations in
January of 2003, the United States announced its intent to comply.
Role of Retaliation
The United States received until the end of 2003 to withdraw the Byrd
Amendment. Legislation for repealing the Act went before Congress in
June 2003, but the Act was still in place in January of 2004. At that time,
eight of the complainants (Brazil, Canada, Chile, the EU, India, Japan,
Korea, and Mexico) requested authorization to retaliate. The Article 22.6
arbitration over the amount of retaliation provided a formula for the
complainants to use when each calculated the amount of retaliation it would
seek.230 The United States reached agreements with Australia, Thailand, and
Indonesia and each of these countries promised not to suspend concessions.
Dumping And Subsidy Offset Act Of 2000, at 1–3 (Mar 2, 2004),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/108th-congress-2003-2004/reports/03-02thomasletter.pdf.
226Request for Consultations, United States –Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act
of 2000, WTO DOC. WT/DS217/1 (Jan. 9, 2001) (Australia group); Request for
Consultations, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WTO
DOC. WT/DS/234/1 (May 21, 2001).
227Panel Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000,
WTO DOC. WT/DS217/R, WT/DS234/R (Jan. 16, 2003).
228U.S. – Byrd Amendment, supra note 4.
229The Appellate Body agreed with the panel that the Byrd Amendment was a specific
action against dumping and subsidies. Furthermore, The Appellate Body explained that the
Byrd Amendment was not in accordance with Article VI of the GATT because the terms of
the Anti-dumping or SCM Agreements did not provide for it. U.S. – Byrd Amendment,
supra note 4, at ¶ 230, 263, and 273.
230Each party received authorization to retaliate annually to cover payments made out to
U.S. industries under the Byrd Amendment against each country’s imports multiplied by
0.72. See Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., 2011 Trade Policy Agenda and 2010 Annual Report
of the Presider on the Trade Agreements Program, at 75 (Mar. 2011),
https://ustr.gov/2011_trade_policy_agenda [hereinafter TPA Agenda].
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The EU, Canada, Mexico, and Japan, however, all proceeded to retaliate at
different points in 2005.231 Even facing retaliation, the United States took
more than two years after the deadline to comply by repealing the Byrd
Amendment as part of the Deficit Reduction Act.232
Beyond Retaliation
The repeal of the Byrd Amendment did not go into effect immediately.
As it had done in resolving the FSC dispute, the United States added a
transition period to the repeal.233 The EU regarded the measure as not truly
compliant and renewed its retaliation.234 Japan and Mexico also followed
suit and renewed retaliation as well in 2006.235 The EU has renewed every
year from 2007 through to the present since U.S. companies are still
collecting payments.236 Japan also maintained sanctions, dropped them
over time as payments started to dwindle,237 and then increased them again
as payments started to increase.238 Complaints about the U.S. noncompliance in the Byrd Amendment dispute by many countries including
the EU, Japan, Brazil, Canada, India and Thailand have been persistent and
numerous at almost every monthly session of the DSB surveillance
meetings.239

231Id.; see also Michael O’Boyle, Mexico Slaps Punitive Duties on U.S. Goods Due to
Noncompliance with WTO Byrd Ruling, 22 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA)1386 (Aug. 25, 2005).
232On balance, The Byrd Amendment measure was more valuable to maintain than the
losses from retaliation. See Benjamin H. Leibman & Kasaundra Tomlin, World Trade
Organization Sanctions, Implementation, and Retaliation, 48 EMPIRICAL ECON. 715, 725
(2015).
233TPA Agenda, supra note 230, at 76. See also Daniel Pruzin, Trading Partners Reject
U.S. Claims of WTO Compliance in Byrd Act Dispute, 23 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 260
(2006).
234TPA Agenda, supra note 230 at 76.
235Id. (Mexico did not keep up retaliation after 2006).
236Daniel Pruzin, EU Sanctions on U.S. Imports Tumble in Byrd Amendment Feud, 31
Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 688, 688 (2014) (noting that the EU has slashed retaliation in 2014
given the sharp decline in 2013 in duties collected on EU imports and distributed to U.S.
firms under the Byrd Amendment). Duties were still being paid in 2016. See Rossella
Brevetti, Senate Clears Customs Bill, Sends It to President, 33 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 222,
222 (2016).
237See Daniel Pruzin, Japan Further Cuts Retaliation on U.S. Imports in WTO Byrd
Dispute, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1444, 1444 (2011).
238Daniel Pruzin, Japan Hikes Retaliatory Duties on U.S. Imports in Byrd Dispute, 30
Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1372, 1372 (2013).
239Dispute Settlement Body, Annual Report, at 10, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/61 (Nov.1,
2013). There were 1013 statements made by WTO Member States at DSB meetings about
the delays in compliance in this dispute. Rhetoric of Legitimacy, supra note 66, at 14, n.24.
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Legacy for the system
The Byrd Amendment dispute marked a continuation by the United
States of delaying compliance by adding a transition provision to the repeal
of the offending measure. Taking this approach has kept the statute alive as
an issue with all WTO Member States that face duties on anti-dumping
cases that started before 2005.
U.S.: Upland Cotton
Basis for the Dispute
The Upland Cotton (WT/DS267) dispute arose from a challenge by
Brazil in 2002 to the provision by the United States of both export and
domestic subsidies to cotton producers and purchasers.240 Agricultural
subsidies and their legality in the WTO system had become a major
negotiating issue in the Doha Round. Both export and domestic subsidies
can violate the SCM Agreement. Export subsidies, if proven, are prohibited
under Article 3.1241 Domestic or actionable subsidies are allowed but may
violate the SCM Agreement if they cause “serious prejudice.”242
Actually, the name of the dispute is misleading. The challenge
brought by Brazil was to key aspects of the U.S. farm support system, 243
and covered other commodities as well. Given the high level of argument
in the Doha Round over how much to cut back subsidization, many other
countries were also concerned about U.S practices in this area. By the time
the dispute reached the panel stage in 2003, sixteen other countries had filed
third-party submissions expressing an interest and gaining the right to
participate in the dispute.244
Both the panel and the AB report which followed, found the United
240See Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WTO Doc. WT/DS267/1 (Oct. 3, 2002).
241SCM Agreement, supra note 100, at art. 3.1.
242Id. at art. 6.3.
243Among the subsidies under attack were the Marketing Loan benefits and Countercyclical payments, which are provided to cotton but also other commodity groups like spars,
soybeans and rice. See Randy Schnepf, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32571, BRAZIL’S WTO
CASE AGAINST THE U.S. COTTON PROGRAM 3 (2011) [hereinafter Schnepf]. See also
Townsend & Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 442 for a full description of both programs. See
also David J. Townsend, Stretching the Dispute Settlement Understanding: U.S.—Cotton’s
Relaxed Interpretation of Cross-Retaliation in the World Trade Organization, 9 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 135, 158 (2010) (describing the programs as “pillars of U.S. farm
policy”) [hereinafter Townsend].
244The countries filing as third parties in the dispute were: Argentina, Australia, Benin,
Canada, Chad, China, Chinese Taipei, EU, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay,
Venezuela, Bolivia, Japan and Thailand. See WTO, US – Upland Cotton,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm.
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States to be in violation of the SCM Agreement and the Agreement on
Agriculture with regard to four different subsidy programs.245 In doing so,
both reports rejected the U.S. argument that none of those subsidies were a
violation of the SCM Agreement because of the understanding on
agricultural subsidies reached in the Agreement on Agriculture.246 Under
attack in the dispute were: (1) Export Credit Guarantees (in which the
USDA provided assistance in financing export transactions); (2) Step 2
Cotton user subsidies (subsidies provided to alleviate the difference
between the foreign and the higher priced U.S. cotton); (3) CounterCyclical Payments (payments made on cotton and other commodities when
prices declined); and (4) Marketing Loan Payments (subsidies to get
farmers through a growing season).247 The first two subsidy programs were
found to be prohibited export subsidies. The AB found the other programs
to be actionable subsidies that caused serious prejudice to Brazil by causing
price suppression in the worldwide cotton market.248 The AB report gave
the United States six months to remove the export subsidies and nine
months to remove the others.249
The United States announced its intention to comply with the DSB
recommendation. Given the dimensions of the farm support programs
found to be illegal, and that there are multiple ways to respond, the United
States took different steps to come into compliance. The United States
altered the export credit guarantee programs in a way that would no longer
make them “subsidies” under the SCM Agreement.250 The United States
also eliminated the Step 2 program altogether.251 The last two programs

245U.S.

– Upland Cotton, supra note 4, at 288–94.
provision of the Agreement on Agriculture, Article 13, exempted certain
agricultural subsidies from scrutiny and attack under the SCM Agreement. The AB found
that the subsidies provided to cotton from 1999-2003, the period covered by the dispute were
not entitled to the protection of the “peace clause” because they were in excess of the 1992
benchmark levels set in Article 13. See U.S. – Upland Cotton, supra note 4, at 146.
247See Townsend & Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 442. See also Karen Halverson Cross,
King Cotton, Developing Countries and the “Peace Clause”: The WTO’s US Cotton
Subsidies Decision, 9 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 149, 184–87 (2006) (provides a full description of
the findings of the Appellate Body).
248U.S. – Upland Cotton, supra note 4, at 290–93.
249Decision by the Arbitrator, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Recourse to
Arbitration Under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WTO
Doc. WT/DS267/ARB/1 (Aug. 1, 2009) [hereinafter ARB 1].
250See Schnepf, supra note 243, at 15; See also U.S. Department of Agriculture USDA
Announces Changes to Export Credit Guarantee Programs to Comply with WTO Findings
(June
30,
2005),
available
at
http:www.fas.usda.gov/scriptsw/PressRelease/pressrel_dout.asp?PrNum=0092-05.
251This elimination was made part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. See Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 1103, 120 Stat. 4 (2006).
246This
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were left untouched.252
When Brazil found the U.S. response inadequate, it sought a
compliance review panel under Article 21.5. The compliance review
process ended with a 2008 finding that U.S. attempts were inadequate: the
export credit guarantees functioned as export subsidies and no changes had
been made with regard to the counter-cyclical and marketing loan
subsidies.253 The elimination of one of the programs—the Step 2 program—
did constitute some compliance. By 2008, however, even that limited
compliance was undone when the United States reinstituted the Step 2
program in the 2008 Farm Bill.254 The United States attempted to look as if
it was complying with the AB report while delaying any real efforts to
come into compliance.
Role of Retaliation
Brazil ultimately sought an authorization for sanctions for the U.S.
failure to remove all of the subsidy programs, including the Step 2
reenactment. The 2009 Article 22.6 arbitration resulted in two reports and
findings for Brazil on all claims but the one about the Step 2 program.255
The panel stated that it lacked authority to authorize a remedy for a measure
enacted after the start of the dispute process.256
Brazil received
authorization, with regard to the other programs, to retaliate with sanctions
on trade in goods calculated annually to reflect the current spending on
cotton subsidies.257 Brazil argued for, and received, the right to use crossretaliation under the GATS and TRIPs Agreement if the amounts of cotton
benefit subsidies exceeded a certain threshold level.258 The Article 22.6
report did not accept all of Brazil’s arguments about sanctions. It rejected
252See Townsend & Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 444–45 (pointing to the Arbitrator’s
decision that the United States had achieved substantive compliance).
253Appellate Body Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU, ¶ 448, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/AB/RW (adopted June 8, 2008).
254See Townsend & Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 445–47 (discussion of this instance of
“uncompliance”).
255See ARB 1, supra note 249, at ¶ 3.64 for the first Arbitrator’s opinion issued regarding
retaliation. This opinion covered the retaliation appropriate for the export guarantee and
Step 2 subsidies. See also Decision by the Arbitrator, United States—Subsidies on Upland
Cotton, Recourse to Arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 7.10 of the SCM
Agreement, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/ARB2 (Aug. 31. 2009) (covering the Marketing Loan
benefits, the Counter-cyclical Payments and the Step 2 payments that were actionable
subsidies).
256See ARB 1, supra note 249, at ¶ 3.60.
257See Daniel Pruzin, Gary G. Yerkey & Ed Taylor, WTO Gives Brazil Green Light to
Impose Sanctions on U.S. Imports in Cotton Case, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1209, 1209
(2009) (the decision allowed cross-retaliation only if the amount of sanctions and the amount
of trade between the countries hit a certain threshold.) [hereinafter Green Light].
258Id.; see also ABR 1, supra note 249, at ¶¶ 5.230–34.
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the Brazilian claim that retaliation solely in goods was not useful. The
report also found that given the large scale of trade between the two
countries, Brazil did not prove that class-retaliation was necessary because
trade in goods retaliation was impracticable or inefficient.259 Despite its
status as a developing country, Brazil could not persuade the 22.6 panel that
it lacked credible retaliatory power over trade in goods.260
As with all requests for authorization of sanctions, Brazil and the
United States offered widely divergent estimations of what the appropriate
amount should be.261 After receiving authorization to retaliate, Brazil
announced that it would take time to do an “in-depth re-examination of the
situation” and then decide whether and how to pursue sanctions.262 Both
disputants immediately announced a willingness to negotiate rather than
allow retaliation to go forward.263 In 2010, eight years after the dispute
started, Brazil and the United States adopted a Framework Agreement to
settle the dispute.264 In exchange for Brazil’s agreement to suspend any
implementation of the authorized sanctions for two years, the United States
agreed to create a fund of $147 million to finance technical assistance for
Brazil’s cotton farmers.265 The basis for the agreement to suspend
retaliation was Brazil’s willingness to await the removal of cotton subsidies
and export guarantees until the 2012 Farm Bill.266 The disputants agreed in
259See

ABR 1, supra note 249, at ¶ 5.166–78.
see Townsend, supra note 243, at 149–51 (arguing that Brazil should not have
been given permission to use cross-retaliation.).
261See Green Light, supra note 258, at 1209 (in its second request to suspend concessions
brought after the 21.5 compliance review process Brazil argued for $2.2 billion a year in
sanctions. The United States by contrast, argued “the maximum amount of retaliation should
be fixed at no more than $22.8 million.”).
262Id. at 1210.
263Id. at 1210–11.
264See Framework of a Mutually Agreed Solution to the Cotton Dispute in the World
Trade
Organization,
June
17,
2010,
WTO
DOC.
WT/DS267,https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/morocco/pdfs/Cotton%20
Framework%20June%202010.pdf; see also Randy Schnepf, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43336, STATUS OF THE WTO BRAZIL-U.S. COTTON CASE (2014) (for an analysis of the main
aspects of the 2010 settlement)[hereinafter CRS Report].
265Id. at 3–4 (the Framework also contained a commitment by the United States to limit
the domestic support paid for cotton and to meet quarterly with regard to the export
guarantee program up through the adoption of the 2012 Farm Bill.); see also Press Release,
USTR, U.S., Brazil Agree on Framework Regarding WTO Cotton Dispute (June 17, 2010),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2010/june/us-brazil-agreeframework-regarding-wto-cotton-disput (describing how the April 2010 negotiations
between the two countries produced an agreement that Brazil would not use the final list of
goods chosen for retaliation if the U.S. agreed to work with it “to establish a fund of
approximately $147.3 million per year on a pro rata basis to provide technical assistance and
capacity building to the cotton sector in Brazil”).
266Ed Taylor, Brazil Suspends Sanctions Against U.S Until 2012 in WTO Cotton Subsidy
260But
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2010 that the Framework Agreement was not a definitive solution267 but an
interim settlement. Brazil did not see the immediate results it hoped for as
the Farm Bill did not pass in 2012. The United States stopped making
payments under the 2010 Framework Agreement in 2013.
When the Farm Bill was finally signed into law in 2014, Brazil
initially took the view that provisions of the new legislation were suspect
and announced that it would seek WTO review of the compliance of the
new legislation as its preliminary analysis indicated “that elements persist
in the new U.S farm bill that distort international cotton trade.”268 By
October 2014, Brazil decided to accept a final settlement, later notified to
the DSB as such, in which it waived rights to pursue retaliation or further
proceedings in Upland Cotton.269 What Brazil received in exchange was
payment of $300 million to the Brazil Cotton Institute and new rules
governing the U.S. farm subsidies program. These new rules singled out
cotton for less subsidization than other farm products and allowed Brazil to
negotiate with the USDA about aspects of how the export credit guarantee
program would operate for the term of the Farm Bill.270 The settlement left
in place some subsidies, although the major program left in place is one that
Brazil could not establish as a violation of the SCM Agreement. As of
2017, Brazil remains concerned about U.S. cotton subsidies programs and
has threatened to bring a WTO action if new subsidies cause damage to
Brazilian farmers.271
Legacy for the system
The Upland Cotton dispute was the first dispute in which a
complainant in a position to use cross-retaliation received such
authorization. Yet rather than employ retaliation, Brazil accepted first an
interim settlement that did not offer much and then a final settlement that
failed to resolve the issue of illegal subsidies. The Upland Cotton result
reveals that interim and final settlements following the authorization of
sanctions often leaves in place some, if not all, of the conduct attacked in
the dispute.
Systemically, the resolution of the dispute is a loss. Brazil brought the
Dispute, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 950 (June 24, 2010).
267This makes the settlement here an interim settlement – the type of settlement that the
Member States have by practice added to the WTO dispute settlement system.
268Michael Kepp, Brazil to Ask WTO to Review U.S. Farm Bill Before Taking Retaliatory
Measures, 31 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 411 (Feb. 27, 2014).
269Rosella Brevetti, CRS Report Says Settlement in Cotton Brawl Could Have Spillover
Effects, 31 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1860 (Oct. 16, 2014).
270CRS Report, supra note 264, at 8–10 (for a description of all of the changes made to
support the U.S. cotton industry in the 2014 Farm Bill).
271Gerson Freitas, Jr., Brazil Says It May Contest Additional U.S. Cotton Subsidies, 34
Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) (July 27, 2017).
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action not only on its own behalf but to benefit cotton producers in many
developing and least-developed African countries that lacked the resources
to pursue a WTO dispute. While Brazil prevailed on the legal arguments, it
reached a settlement with the United States that was solely a bilateral
settlement.272 The larger WTO membership273 would have benefitted from a
resolution that would have lessened the impact of the U.S. subsidies on all
impacted Member States. Such a settlement would have come about only if
the disputants had gone to the WTO for a waiver.
While the operation of the dispute settlement failed the cotton
producing nations, the WTO did deliver a decision on Cotton as part of the
Nairobi Ministerial Conference in December 2015. The Cotton decision,
reached 13 years after the Upland Cotton dispute began, calls for real aid to
least developed and developing country cotton producers. The Cotton
decision provides for an immediate end to cotton export subsidies by
developed countries and for duty and quota-free access to developed
country markets from January 1, 2016.274
U.S.: Gambling
Basis for Dispute
The Gambling dispute (WT/DS 285) began when Antigua and
Barbuda filed a request for consultations in March 2003.275 Antigua
complained that the cumulative effect of the U.S. federal, state, and local
rules was to prevent the supply of gambling and betting services being
supplied on a cross-border basis, (i.e., offshore through the internet) by
another WTO Member. Antigua contended that these measures were

272Krzysztof J. Pelc, Why the deal to pay Brazil $300 million just to keep U.S. cotton
subsidies is bad for the WTO, poor countries and the U.S. taxpayers, WASH. POST (Oct. 12,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/12/why-the-deal-topay-brazil-300-million-just-to-keep-u-s-cotton-subsidies-is-bad-for-the-wto-poor-countriesand-u-s-taxpayers/(According to Pelc: “In Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali, known
collectively as the “Cotton Four”, the more than 10 million people relying on cotton revenue
will continue to compete against subsidized American farmers. The promise of WTO
litigation is that complainants provide a public good by seeking enforcement on behalf of all
countries with a stake in the matter. Bilateral settlements such as the U.S.-Brazil deal negate
this hope.”).
273Simon Evenett & Alejandro Jara, Settling WTO disputes without solving the problem:
Abusing compensation, VOX EU, Dec. 9, 2014, http://voxeu.org/article/settling-wto-disputeswithout-solving-problem-abusing-compensation.
274Briefing
Note,
WTO,
Cotton
Negotiations,
(2015),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc10_e/briefing_notes_e/brief_cotton_e.ht
m (for a description of the decision and what it provides).
275Request for Consultations, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WTO DOC. WT/DS285/1 (March 13, 2003).
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inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the GATS276 and on the
commitment that the United States had made to open services in this area.277
The dispute was important to Antigua because it had an online gambling
industry that lost crucial market access due to the U.S. measures.278
When the United States refused to conduct extensive consultations,
Antigua requested a panel. Both the panel279 and the AB panel280 found for
Antigua. The Appellate Body report concluded that the three federal
gambling laws under attack—the Wire Act, The Travel Act, and the Illegal
Gambling Act—did restrict Antigua’s market access but qualified that
holding since the laws fell within Article XIV exception for the protection
of public morals.281 The United States could not be fully excused under
Article XIV, however, as it still allowed some online gambling operations,
largely those focused on horse racing. As a result, the U.S. actions banning
Antigua from offering online gambling amounted to discrimination.282
The DSB adopted the AB report and recommendations in April 2005
and the United States announced its intention to comply.283 Upon the
expiration of its reasonable period to comply, the United States announced
that it was in compliance. Antigua, however, sought an Article 21.5
compliance review and won a decision stating that the United States had not
brought its measures into compliance. The United States did take one
course of action prior to the 21.5 compliance review report—it initiated the
procedure under Article XXI of the GATS to modify the schedule of U.S.
service commitments. The U.S. position was that this rescheduling
reflected the country’s original intent that had always been to exclude
gambling and betting services from services it meant to open under the
GATS Agreement.284 The DSB adopted the Article 21.5 panel report in
2007. Since the United States had made no steps towards compliance,
Antigua requested authorization to suspend concessions.285
276Id.

at 1.
measures were alleged to violate Articles II, VI, VIII, XI, XVI and XVII of
GATS. Id. The Market Opening Commitments for Services are contained in the U.S.
schedule for commitments annexed to GATS.
278See Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L. J. 1193, 1211–18
(2005). See also Isaac Wohl, The Antigua-United States Online Gambling Dispute, J. INT’L
COM. & ECON. 1, 2 (2009) (about the importance of the gaming industry to the Antiguan
economy).
279Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WTO DOC. WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004).
280
U.S. – Gambling, supra note 4.
281Id. at ¶ 326.
282Id. at 369.
283TPA Agenda, supra note 230, at 80.
284Id. (This was the U.S. position during the litigation and the U.S. continued to claim the
same in 2011.).
285Id.
277The
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Role of Retaliation
The United States followed the standard practice of seeking an arbitral
panel over the appropriate amount of retaliation. In December 2007, this
Article 22.6 arbitration resulted in a finding that Antigua suffered an annual
level of nullification or impairment of benefits of $21 million. Given the
country’s small size compared to the United States and its limited ability to
impose retaliation on trade in goods effectively, the DSB authorized
Antigua to pursue cross-retaliation by suspending concessions under the
TRIPs Agreement relating to five of the protected forms of intellectual
property under that agreement—copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs,
patents and trade secrets.286
In 2007 and 2008, the United States proceeded to reach agreement
with every WTO Member affected by the change put in place by its Article
XXI rescheduling.287 This modification arguably eliminated the original
basis for the violation claimed by Antigua. However, this change came
after a WTO determination of illegality.288
Antigua was not one of the WTO Members that received benefits from
the scheduling, as it was not pleased with the offer of compensation made
to it by the United States. Antigua was also not in a position to retaliate.
The U.S. position has been that the two countries are still seeking a
mutually satisfactory resolution.289 The view of Antigua, four years after
getting authorization for retaliation, is that it won the “ultimate Pyrrhic
victory.”290 Antigua has argued that the WTO needs to find solutions for
cases like its own and requested the Director General find some way to use
his good offices to help with the resolution of the dispute.291 In January
2014, Antigua received authorization to employ cross-retaliation against
U.S. intellectual property rights in an annual amount of $21 million.
Antigua asked the United States to make one last effort at arriving at a
negotiated settlement.292 Antigua considered setting up an online platform,
286Arbitration Report United States–Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WTO DOC. WT/DS285 (DEC. 21, 2007) ¶ 4.20.
287See TPA Agenda, supra note 230, at 80 (under Article XXI of GATS WTO Members
are allowed to modify or withdraw market access commitment if they offer compensation.
Members that are affected can then claim compensatory adjustments under Art. XXI:2(a)).
288See Andrew D. Mitchell & Constantine Salonidis, David’s Sling: Cross-Retaliation in
International Trade Disputes, 45 J. WORLD TRADE 457, 475–76 (2011) [hereinafter Mitchell
& Salonidis].
289
TPA, supra note 230, at 80.
290Statement by Colin Murdoch, Antigua and Barbuda Ambassador to the WTO at the 8th
Session
of
the
WTO
Ministerial
Conference
(Dec.
17,
2011),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min11_e/min11_statements_e.htm.
291Id.
292Daniel Pruzin, Antigua Asks U.S. to Make ‘Last Effort’ to Comply with WTO Gambling
Ruling, 30 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 437 (Mar. 28, 2013).
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which would allow it to offer downloads of films and music held by U.S.
intellectual property rights holders.293 The U.S. response was that the DSB
authorization for retaliation would not justify intellectual property theft or
violations of intellectual property rights.294 Although Antigua announced
that it was close to formalizing its plans to retaliate, it has never done so.
The last time Antigua and the United States had negotiations aimed at
settling the dispute was in July 2015.295 The dispute has gone on for
thirteen years from its start and for two years since the DSB granted
Antigua authorization to retaliate. As of September 2017, Antigua is still
considering cross retaliation if the United States fails to reach a final
agreement.296
Legacy for the system
The Gambling dispute reveals in starkest terms how difficult it is for a
smaller WTO member state to prevail against a well-developed member
that chooses to neither comply nor settle. Antigua was able to bring its
dispute and win a WTO decision and a DSB authorization to retaliate.
Nevertheless, the country has been unable to get the United States to focus
on serious negotiations for a settlement. Moreover, the complainant in this
instance would take on a great risk if it experimented with cross-retaliation.
U.S.: Zeroing
Basis of the Dispute
Zeroing encompasses eighteen different disputes filed with the WTO’s
dispute settlement system.297 All but the first dispute on this issue, EC: Bed

293See Daniel Pruzin, Antigua Readies Retaliation against U.S. Intellectual Property
Rights Holders, 31 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 462, (Mar. 6, 2014); see also Daniel Pruzin,
Antigua to Set Up Platform for Enforcing IP Sanctions Against U.S. in WTO Dispute, 87
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 60 (Nov. 8, 2013).
294Id.
295Bryce Baschuk, U.S. to Settle WTO Online Gambling Dispute, 32 Int’l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1380 (Aug. 6, 2015).
296In 2016 Antigua threatened to retaliate See Bryce Baschuk, Antigua Issues Ultimatum
to U.S. Over Gambling Dispute, 33 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1686 (Dec. 1, 2016). At a
meeting of the DSB on September 29, 2017, Antigua and the United states discussed the
dispute. The United States said that it “remains committed” to resolving the dispute but did
not offer a settlement. Antigua announced that it was still considering using its DSB
authorization to cross-retaliate. See Bryce Baschuk, Antigua and Barbuda Urges U.S. to
Settle Gambling Ban Dispute, 34 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1321 (Oct. 5, 2017).
297The WTO Dispute Settlement page cross-references eighteen different disputes in
which “zeroing” was at issue between the disputants. World Trade Organization, “Index of
Disputes,”
(Sept.
1,
2017),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm.
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Linen,298 were filed against the United States and its practice for calculating
margins of dumping when determining what tariffs to put in place following
anti-dumping determinations.299 Article VI of the GATT and the WTO
Anti-Dumping Agreement allows member states to impose extra duties on
dumped goods—those sold in the target market below the price in home
market sales or the cost of production. The Anti-Dumping Agreement
contains limitations on how member states choosing to fight this unfair
trade practice must administer their proceedings. The Anti-Dumping
Agreement did not clarify whether “zeroing” was illegal.300 Prior to the
EC: Bed Linen dispute, the United States and the EU both calculated the
margin of dumping between the home market (“normal value”) price and
the export price (the price in the country receiving the good) for each type
of product and aggregated these prices while leaving out or “zeroing” any
calculation where the export price was higher. The use of zeroing inflates
dumping margins. The EU abandoned the practice after Bed Linen, when
the AB report ruled the practice to be illegal.301
The United States, by contrast, continued to insist that zeroing was not
illegal and continued to use this method of calculation. By sticking to
zeroing, the United States ensured that all of its antidumping determinations
issued in original cases and in administrative reviews done on each case
(necessary for calculating a margin for each of the five (5) years of
antidumping relief) would reflect the contested practice.
Starting in 1999, a series of disputes were filed arguing that U.S.
practice violated the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Although some panels
supported the U.S. position on the legality of zeroing, the AB consistently
298Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports on
Cotton-type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/AB/R (March 1, 2001). This was the first
decision by an AB panel that the practice of zeroing in antidumping actions violated the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
299The U.S. has always been a proponent of the practice and remains so as of this date.
See Press Release, USTR Kirk Announces Solution to Years-old Zeroing Disputes, Office of
the United States Trade Representative, (Feb. 2012) https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/press-releases/2012/united-states-trade-representative-ron-kirkannounces-solu (“The United States has repeatedly explained that the WTO Appellate
Bodyin making its findings on zeroingdid not apply the text of the Antidumping
Agreement and, therefore, exceeded its mandate.”).
300See generally Sungjoon Cho, Global Constitutional Lawmaking, 31 U. P A. J. INT’L L.
621, 644–49 (2010) [hereinafter Cho] for a discussion of how the AB position on zeroing
can be seen as a constitutional one since there has been division on this issue among
Members in the Doha Negotiations.
301See Chad P. Bown & Thomas Prusa, U.S. Antidumping Much Ado About Zeroing
(World Bank Working Paper 2010) at 4 available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs
/10.1596/1813-9450-5352. Bown and Prusa note that it was easier for the EU and any other
WTO members to drop the practice of dumping because all of them use a prospective duty
assessment system. By contrast, the U.S. uses a retrospective system. As a result, eliminating
the zeroing practice would affect calculations of margins in all subsequent reviews. Id. at 30.
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rejected those decisions. The United States responded to this series of
losses by trying to get the issue of zeroing into the Doha Round
negotiations on the Anti-Dumping Agreement302 and by eliminating the
practice in its original actions.303 The United States, however, refused to
eliminate the practice in all of the numerous administrative reviews done
for outstanding antidumping orders.
Both the EU and Japan brought disputes in 2003 and 2004 (WT/DS294
and WT/DS322) focused on U.S. use of the zeroing practice in
administrative reviews.304 The United States lost those cases in 2006 and
2007.305 Even after these losses, the United States retained the practice.
After compliance reviews also went against the United States in 2009,306 the
EU and Japan sought authorization from an Article 22.6 arbitration to
suspend concessions in late 2010.307
Role of Retaliation
During negotiations over how to resolve the dispute, the EU and Japan
agreed to suspend the 22.6 proceedings so that the United States could
come into compliance. The United States made a commitment in late 2010
to remove zeroing once it adopted a final rule to that effect. However, there
was not real progress on change until February of 2012. At that time, the
EU and Japan signed agreements with the United States to finalize the
required rule changes and to reopen the administrative reviews and reviews
the anti-dumping tariffs on multiple cases faced by imports from each
country.308 The United States published the final rule in February 2012
eliminating the use of zeroing for all reviews pending before the
Department of Commerce as of April 2012.309 The United States also
302See

Cho, supra note 300 at 647–48.

303Id.
304Request for Consultations by Japan, United States—Laws, Regulations and
Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins, WT/DS322/1 (Nov. 24, 2004); Request for
Consultations by EC, United States—Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating
Dumping Margins, WT/DS294/1 (June 12, 2003).
305Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset
Reviews, WT/DS322/AB/R (Jan. 9, 2007); Appellate Body Report, United States - Laws,
Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins, WT/DS322/AB/R (Apr.
18, 2006).
306Article 21.5 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and
Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/AB/RW (August 18, 2009); Article 21.5 Appellate Body
Report, United States—Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping
Margins, WT/DS294/RW (Dec. 17, 2008).
307See TPA Agenda, supra note 230, at 82.
308See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Seeking Talks with EU to Avert Sanctions for Zeroing, 27 Int’l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 780 (May 27, 2010).
309See Sungjoon Cho, ASIL Insight, No More Zeroing: The United States Changes its
Antidumping Policy (March 9, 2012) at 1 available at: https://www.asil.org/insights/volume
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agreed to recalculate the antidumping margins in two zeroing disputes
brought by the EU, one by Mexico and the one by Japan.310
The settlement and rule change did not resolve all zeroing issues faced
by the United States. The United States has not reopened and recalculated
all of the dumping margins in cases determined prior to April 2012. Even
after resolving the Zeroing dispute, the United States has faced challenges
on other aspects of the use of the practice from Brazil, China, South Korea
and Vietnam.311
Retaliation was threatened but not exercised in the Zeroing dispute.
While under threat, the United States delayed compliance for two years.
Even though it took time to adopt an administrative rule change—not
subject to Congressional review or input—retaliation served as a prompting
factor in the U.S. decision to make a change.
U.S.: Certain Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) Requirements
(WT/DS 384/386)
Basis of the Dispute
The Certain Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) requirements dispute
began in late 2008 when Canada requested consultations regarding the
mandatory country of origin labeling on beef and pork products required in
the Farm Bill of 2008.312 The United States has a long tradition of requiring
labels of origin for imported products but also of exempting from
agricultural commodities in their natural state.313 The United States
changed its position on this issue in the 2002 Farm Bill, but concerns raised
by the food and agriculture industries about how implementation would
work kept any measure requiring labeling stalled until the 2008 Farm
Bill.314 Mexico later joined Canada in consultations with the United States.
/16/issue/8/no-more-zeroing-united-states-changes-its-antidumping-policy-comply-wto.
310Id. at 3, 4.
311See Brian Flood, WTO to Rule in September on Washer, Solar Panel Disputes, 33 Int’l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1130 (Aug. 11, 2016) (regarding a challenge by South Korea); Bryce
Baschuk, Shrimp Exporter No Longer Subject to Antidumping Duties, 33 Int’l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1023 (July,21, 2016) (regarding a dispute brought by Vietnam); Daniel Pruzin, WTO
Issues Final Rule Condemning U.S. Use of Zeroing in China Dumping Cases, 29 Int’l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 758 (May 10,2012); Daniel Pruzin, Brazil Signals Possible WTO Challenge on
U.S. Compliance with Orange Juice Ruling, 29 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 629 (Apr. 19,2012).
312Request for Consultations, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labeling
(COOL) Requirements, WTO Doc. WT/DS/384/1 (Dec. 1, 2008). The COOL dispute was
one of a trio of contemporaneous disputes brought against the United States alleging
violations of the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT Agreement).
313Joel L. Green, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22955, COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELING FOR
FOODS AND THE WTO TRADE DISPUTE ON MEAT LABELING, at 2 (2015), available at:
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22955.pdf [hereinafter CRS COOL Report].
314There was not complete accord within the United States about the value or utility of
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Both Canada and Mexico alleged that the COOL provisions violated the
Article III National Treatment obligation of the GATT and Article 2 of the
Technical Barriers to Trade.315 Mexico also filed a dispute, WT/D386,
based on the same claims. When consultations failed, Canada requested a
panel. Sixteen countries requested third-party rights in the Canada/U.S.
dispute.316
In 2011, the panel considered the claims of Canada and Mexico
together and found that the country of origin labeling measures qualified as
a technical regulation under the TBT Agreement because they are legally
enforceable requirements governing the labeling of meat products offered
for sale.317 With this threshold issue decided, the panel went on to find that
the COOL measures violated both Article 2.1 (national treatment obligation
under that agreement) and 2.2 (the measure failed to fulfill legitimate
objectives).318 The panel found that in order to comply with COOL
requirements, producers in the U.S. had to segregate imported and domestic
livestock and that this discouraged the use of imported livestock.319 Both
the United States and Canada appealed the panel decision. The United
States argued against the panel interpretation of the TBT Agreement while
Canada appealed aspects of the TBT interpretation and raised issues about
the National Treatment claim. The Appellate Body report, issued in August
2012, upheld the Panel determination against the United States but for
different reasons. The Appellate Body found a violation of Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement 320 but found no violation of Article 2.2.321
The United States requested a reasonable period to comply with the
country of origin labeling. Throughout the process of the creation of the COOL measure in
2008 and its revision in 2009, there were organized U.S. industry groups on both sides of the
issue. See Erik Wasson & Alan Bjerga, Congress to Repeal Meat Labeling Rules to Stop
Penalty, 32 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2195 (Dec. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Wasson & Bjerga].
315Other violations were also alleged – based on Articles IX.4 and X.3 of the GATT and
Article 2 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin – but the dispute hinged on the National
Treatment and TBT claims.
316Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, the EU, Guatemala, India, Japan, South
Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, and Taiwan all filed as Third Parties in the Canada
dispute.
317Panel Report, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labeling (COOL)
Requirements, ¶¶ 7.216–.217, WTO Doc. WT/DS384,386/R (Nov. 18, 2011).
318Id. ¶¶ 7.547–.548 (regarding Art. 2.1 of the TBT Agreement), 7.718 (regarding Art. 2.2
of the TBT Agreement). See WTO, US – COOL, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/cases_e/ds384_e.htm.
319The panel did not reach the GATT National Treatment claim in its report.
320U.S. – COOL, supra note 4, at ¶¶. 349–50.
The gist of the Appellate Body
determination was that the COOL measure required record keeping and verification
requirements that were not included in the label information provided to consumers. The
necessary recordkeeping and verification requirements to comply with COOL gave U.S.
producers an incentive to select U.S. products over imports.
321Id. at ¶ 491.
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AB determination. After an arbitration of the issue, the United States
received until December 2012, ten months from the date of the adoption of
the Appellate Body report, to come into compliance with its
recommendation.322 The day after the reasonable period to comply expired,
the United States informed the DSB that the U.S. Department of
Agriculture had revised the COOL requirements and that the new final rule
brought the United States into compliance.323 Under the revised rule,
country of origin labels for the meat products were required to include a
country of origin reflecting each step in the production process—where the
animal was born, raise, and slaughtered. The new rule also did not allow
meat products to be comprised of portions comingled from different
countries.324 Canada objected to the new COOL final rule for its lack of
compliance with the AB report and because it was more restrictive than the
original measure reviewed by the WTO. The United States argued that the
revised measure responded to issues raised in the AB report. Since it
passed a revised version of the COOL rule, the United States gained
additional time to deal with the dispute and the problem of having to meet
the concerns of a U.S. industry backing the legislation.325
In August 2013, Canada requested an Article 21.5 compliance panel in
August 2013 and one was established in September 2014. The Article 21.5
panel ruled on the common objections raised by Canada and Mexico326
about how the new rule also violated Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
The Article 21.5 panel found that the new rule increased the detrimental
impact on beef and pork imports into the U.S. market.327 The Article 21.5
panel also found that the new rule violated the National Treatment
obligation of GATT.328 In May 2015, the Appellate Body 21.5 report was
issued.329 The AB 21.5 report focused most of its efforts on rejecting the
322Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, United States—Certain Country of Origin Labeling
(COOL) Requirements, ¶ 123, WTO Doc. WT/DS384/24 and WT/DS386/23 (Dec. 4, 2012).
323See Rossella Brevetti, Proposed COOL Changes Would Provide Consumers With more
Information, 30 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 384 (Mar. 14, 2013).
324For a description of how the revised rule operated see CRS COOL Report, supra note
314, at 16–18.
325The industry groups supporting the COOL legislation were happy with the U.S.
decision to revise COOL. The groups that had been in opposition to the measure also
decried the new version and filed a federal lawsuit against the revised measure. Id. at 19,
app. F.
326
Mexico also challenged whether the new rule brought the United States into
compliance in its dispute with the United States.
327Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU, Panel Report, United States—Certain Country of
Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, ¶ 7.285, WTO Doc. WT/DS384,386/RW (Oct. 20,
2014).
328Id. at ¶ 7.643.
329Appellate Body Report, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL)
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U.S. attempt to justify the new rule. The AB report agreed with the Article
21.5 panel that there was a violation of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
The AB pointed out that the record keeping and verification requirements
necessitated by the implementation of the revised country of origin labeling
rule imposed a disproportionate burden on foreign producers and processors
of livestock not explained by the need to provide country of origin
information to consumers.330
Role of Retaliation
Even before going through the appeal of the 21.5 report, Canada and
Mexico had established retaliation lists. Canada’s list targeted beef and
pork imports, among other products, from the United States.331 After
prevailing in the AB 21.5 compliance review, Canada and Mexico sought
DSB authorization to suspend concessions against the United States. The
Article 22.6 arbitration determined that the amount of suspended
concessions was approximately $1,054.73 million CAD for Canada and
$227.76 million for Mexico.332 Canada and Mexico pushed to have the
final authorization for the suspension of concessions issued at the Nairobi
Ministerial Conference in December of 2015. The United States blocked
that effort, arguing that it was unprecedented for the DSB to meet during a
ministerial conference.333 The DSB authorized the suspension right after
the conference on December 21, 2015.
As the dispute progressed through the arbitration over the amount of
retaliation, the U.S. Congress was already considering options for action
that would allow the United States to avoid the imposition of sanctions
aimed directly at the meat industries.334 Congress considered revising the
COOL legislation yet again, including making it into a voluntary
program.335 In the end, however, there was a great deal of support for the
Requirements, WTO Doc. WT/DS384,386/AB/RW (adopted May 29, 2015).
330Id. at ¶¶ 5.117–5.122.
331See Global Affairs Canada, Statement by Ministers Fast and Ritz on U.S. Country of
Origin Labelling (June 7, 2013), http://www.international.gc.ca/media_commerce/comm/
news-communiques/2013/06/07a.aspx?lang=eng (the press release in which Canada rejected
the new COOL rule had an attached retaliation list); see also Bryce Baschuk, Canada,
Mexico Threaten Retaliation After WTO Adopts Final Labelling Ruling, 32 Int’l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1006 (June 4, 2015).
332Decision by the Arbitrator, Recourse to Arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU by
the United States, United States—Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL)
Requirements, ¶¶ 6.80–.82, ¶ 7, WTO Doc. WT/DS384, 386/ARB (Dec. 7, 2015).
333Bryce Baschuk, U.S. Blocks Canada, Mexico From Labeling Retaliation, 32 Int’l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 2214 (Dec. 24, 2015).
334The National Cattlemen’s Association had estimated that if retaliation went into effect,
U.S. beef producers would lose about 10 cents per pound on each pound of imports it sold to
Canada and Mexico. Wasson & Bjerga, supra note 315.
335Catherine Boudreau, Sen. Stabenow Proposes Meat Labeling Alternative to Solve WTO

110

Taylor_jci2 (Do Not Delete)

12/5/2017 4:12 PM

Beyond Retaliation
38:55 (2017)

easier-to-implement solution of repealing the legislation.336 The House of
Representatives passed legislation in June 2015 repealing COOL as it
applied to all meat products. The repeal was part of an omnibus spending
bill, passed by both the House and the Senate and signed by President
Obama in December 2015. 337 The final rule implementing the repeal went
into effect in March 2016,338 seven years after the beginning of the WTO
dispute.
The threat of sanctions from both NAFTA partners provided enough
incentive for the United States to move to quick action regarding the repeal
of the COOL legislation. Even after the repeal, Canada sought DSB
authorization of retaliation so that it could take action if the United States
failed to follow through on the repeal.339
Problems revealed by the disputes involving sustained non-compliance
The disputes that went to retaliation and beyond reveal three problems
for the WTO dispute settlement system. First, large, developed member
states can avoid compliance by taking and continuing to take the hit of
retaliation until they can arrange interim and final settlements or decide to
terminate the offending policy. The Hormones, Bananas III, Foreign Sales
Corporations (FSC), and Byrd Amendment disputes all illustrate this reality.
In three of these disputes, Bananas III, Hormones and the Byrd Agreement,
the sanctions continued for years—Bananas III (two years), Hormones
(over a decade with the potential for a return) and Byrd Amendment (seven
years). Large, developed member states have stalled compliance and
gained more time to maintain the WTO-illegal policy by returning to the
dispute settlement process. Eight of the eleven disputes that have gone to
retaliation or beyond have spawned either multiple disputes over
compliance with the final AB decision, follow-up DSU litigation, or both.340
In every dispute where the United States fixed an illegal measure and faced
a compliance review for the new measure—in FSC, Byrd Amendment,
Upland Cotton, and COOL—the compliance review panel found the U.S.
fix to be illegal.
Dispute, 32 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1204 (July 2, 2015).
336See Bryce Baschuk & Catherine Boudreau, WTO Rejects U.S. Appeal of COOL
Requirements Covering Meat Labeling, 32 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 924 (May 21, 2015); see
also CRS COOL Report, supra note 314, at 23 (There was a COOL Reform Coalition of
more than one hundred businesses pushing Congress to repeal the COOL legislation).
337Peter Menyasz, Canada Celebrates Resolution of the COOL Dispute, 32 Int’l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 2235 (Dec. 24, 2015).
338Rosella Brevetti, UDSA Nixes Some Labeling Requirements, 33 Int’l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 319 (Mar. 3, 2016).
339Peter Menyasz, Canada Celebrates Resolution of COOL Dispute, 32 Int’l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 2235 (Dec. 24, 2015)
340The only disputes where the threat of retaliation was enough to get the U.S. to respond
were the Antidumping Act of 1916, Zeroing, and COOL disputes.
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Second, large, developed member states can delay resolution of a
dispute long enough to encourage the complainant to settle the dispute on
favorable terms or give them longer to continue the violative measure.341
As part of this delay, these respondents have signaled compliance by
changing the measure found to be illegal, but in ways that fail to solve the
market access problem of the complainant or to remove the WTO
illegality.342 In most cases, this course of conduct provokes a compliance
challenge by the complainant and additional years of dispute resolution
before a compliance panel (and usually, an appellate review of that panel)
also finds the new measure to violate the WTO rules in play. The EU
engaged in this course of conduct in Hormones and Bananas III. The U.S.
used this approach in the FSC, Byrd Amendment, Upland Cotton, and
COOL disputes.
Third, the case studies suggest that developing countries cannot use the
ultimate penalty effectively as a threat or a sanction.343
Crucial
asymmetries exist between developed and developing member states with
regard to the incentive to deviate from compliance and the capacity to
respond to such deviations.344 Large, developed member states can and
have taken the hit of retaliation in order to preserve a measure they want to
keep. Similarly, these member states can afford to absorb harm that comes
from using retaliation to try to get compliance from a resisting member
state.
By contrast, developing member states have not yet proven able to
take the hit of retaliation or use it against non-complying respondents. To
date, only one developing country, Brazil, has resisted compliance and
provoked a request for sanctions. Brazil followed this path in Regional
Aircraft. However, it is worth noting that Brazil did so only where it had
launched a companion dispute against Canada. Developing member states
up against larger developed member states have not always found access to
retaliation helpful.345 In none of the disputes where the suspension of
concessions was authorized (Bananas III, Regional Aircraft, Upland
Cotton, and Gambling) was it employed. Even where the DSU has
341See Gregory Shaffer, Manfred Elsig & Sergio Puig, The Law and Politics of WTO
Dispute Settlement, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, OXFORD UNIV. PRESS (Wayne
Sandholtz
&
Christopher
Whytok
eds.,
2016)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2748883, at 22.
342Id. See Upland Cotton at 51–54 for a discussion of how the settlements worked.
343Id.
344See Bernard Hoekman, Proposals for WTO Reform: A Synthesis and Assessment 16
(World Bank, International Trade Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic
Management Network, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5525, 2011) (“There are
asymmetric incentives for countries to deviate from the WTO, as the ultimate threat that can
be made against a member state that does not comply is retaliation.”).
345Rolland, supra note 8, at 191.
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authorized suspension of concessions, developing Member States have
never employed it. In Bananas III, Ecuador sought and received the right to
use retaliation but accepted a settlement that required many more years of
negotiation and litigation before providing true relief.346 In the Gambling
dispute, Antigua was also authorized to retaliate. Years after this
authorization, Antigua remains unable to obtain a negotiated settlement
from the United States or develop a plan for retaliation that would not
create significant problems for the small country. 347 Brazil, a large
developing country, and therefore in a better position to retaliate, was
content to negotiate settlements in Upland Cotton348 for far less than the
harm suffered according to retaliation authorization. Brazil did better in
Regional Aircraft but only because Canada also faced sanctions and the two
countries decided to settle the issue outside the WTO.
II.

WHAT DOES NOT WORK IN THE DSU SYSTEM
The disputes involving sustained non-compliance highlight how
certain aspects of the system—delay, member-control over compliance,
limitations in the DSU, and limitations in the remedy of retaliation—harm
the DSU system.
Delay
The DSU has strict time limits for pursuing claims through the panel
and Appellate Body stages.349 The member states considered timeliness to
be an important enough issue to insist that: “the prompt settlement of
situations . . . is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the
maintenance of a proper balance between the rights and obligations of
members.”350 If member states abided by these time limits, an average
dispute would resolve in one year.351 Studies conducted on the timelines in
the DSU system establish that the process as it operates fails to meet almost
every DSU timeline.352 Two things have made the time limits built into the
system illusory. Panels have the right to report that they require additional
time when a case has substantive or procedural complexities.353 Many
346See

infra pp. 81–84.
infra pp. 81–84.
348See supra note 240, at 51–54.
349DSU, supra note 14, at art. 20.
350
Id. at art. 3.3.
351See Brewster, supra note 25, at 107.
352See Johannesson & Mavroidis, supra note 25, at 8–15. The study covers all disputes
from the inception of the DSU system in 1995 through 2016. Id. at 8 (a chart showing all of
the timelines and for the actual average times taken in the WTO disputes). See also
Brewster, supra note 25, at 117–25.
353Brewster, supra note 25, at 121.
347See
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WTO disputes, and almost every one of the disputes analyzed above, were
either factually complex and/or required the panel or the AB panel to rule
on procedural aspects of the DSU.
Wholly apart from the delays springing from the panel and AB
proceedings are the delays that occur during the implementation process.
Respondents can gain extra time to comply or avoid sanctions by requesting
an Article 21.3 decision on what constitutes a reasonable time to comply
and by declaring that they have come into compliance thereby triggering an
Article 21.5 compliance review. Respondents are also entitled to an AB
level consideration of the compliance review panel report. If the
complainant proceeds to request a suspension of concessions, the
respondent then becomes entitled to seek an Article 22.6 arbitration about
the proper amount of that retaliation.
In each of the cases of sustained non-compliance, the disputants went
through every stage of the process and often added on additional time
seeking a negotiated settlement.354 Consequently, almost every one of the
disputes added two to four years to the time taken just to get to the
imposition of retaliation.355 Even after retaliation, delay creeps into the
process. Several of the cases examined above were resolved with a
mutually agreed solution that was actually an interim settlement.356
Delay itself constitutes a serious problem as it undercuts the ability of
the successful complainant to procure the relief. Compounding the problem
of delay is the prospective nature of the DSU remedy, which assures that no
relief to the complainant until the dispute settlement process is completed.
The longer the compliance process—at whatever stage it occurs—the
longer the complainant suffers from the WTO-illegal measure.357 This
means delay of full compliance in some disputes for years. The case
studies reveal that delay also occurs whenever a member state complies, it
phases in the new measure over time. The United States has used this
strategy in the FSC and Byrd Amendment disputes.
Compliance Control Allows for Manipulation
The panel and Appellate Body reports clarify the legal rights and
obligations of the members. The conclusion of every report finding against
the losing respondent states that the member should bring the measure(s)
found inconsistent “into conformity with its obligations under that [WTO]
Agreement.”358 However, the reports do not tell the losing respondent how
354See

discussion supra Sections Hormones, Bananas III, FSC, and Upland Cotton.
supra note 25, at 124–25 (noting that the period for the panel to retaliation
authorization in Upland Cotton was six and one-half years).
356See supra pp. 12–13 for a discussion of the problem with such interim settlements.
357Brewster, supra note 25, at 120.
358See DSU, supra note 14, at art. 19.1 (“Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes
355Brewster,

114

Taylor_jci2 (Do Not Delete)

12/5/2017 4:12 PM

Beyond Retaliation
38:55 (2017)

to comply with this recommendation. These respondents have full freedom
to decide how to comply. The member states clearly want a system that
allows member control over compliance. However, the DSU offers such
complete freedom that a losing respondent can comply in a way that
amounts to avoidance, if not bad faith.359 member states seeking to avoid
compliance have learned to game the system.360 A respondent can take
advantage of all of the stages of the process to obtain delays. A respondent
can take legislative action to comply that does not truly address the WTOillegality thus forcing more litigation. A respondent can litigate at great
length exploiting every textual ambiguity and gap in the WTO agreement in
contest and in the DSU itself. All of these courses of action occurred in the
Bananas III, Hormones, FSC, Upland Cotton, Zeroing, and COOL disputes.
These compliance avoidance techniques now offer a roadmap for other
losing respondents to follow.
Limitations of the DSU: A Flaw and a Gap
The disputes going to retaliation and beyond prove that the
enforcement articles of the DSU have a flaw and a gap. The flaw is the lack
of any true system of surveillance. Article 21.6 requires the DSB to keep a
dispute, including whether or not the losing respondent has implemented its
obligation, “under surveillance.”361 However, the DSU does not set out a
procedure for the DSB to follow when conducting this surveillance362
despite its great importance.363 The DSB clearly has authority to create such
a surveillance procedure and to specify what would be required to satisfy its
that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member
concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement.” For an illustration of this
see U.S.—COOL, supra note 4, at para. 497 (“The Appellate Body recommends that the
DSB request the United States to brings its measures found in this Report, and in the Mexico
Panel Report as modified by this Report, to be inconsistent with the GATT 1994 and the
TBT Agreement, into conformity with its obligations under those Agreements.”).
359See supra pp. 23–25 (Hormones—EU never withdrew the ban), 34–36 (FSC—passage
of a measure to comply that did not and later phase-in of a repeal), and 51 (Upland Cotton).
360Brewster, supra note 25, at 122.
361DSU, supra note 14, at art. 21.6.
362Jonathan T. Fried, 2013 In WTO Dispute Settlement, Reflections from the Chair of the
Dispute Settlement Body, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Aug. 30, 2017),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/jfried_13_e.htm [hereinafter Fried].
According to Fried, there has been a “collective failure to do just to one of the most
important roles accorded to the DSB” in how the DSB has handled surveillance. Fried
suggests that part of the problem has been the lack of rules in this area.
363Fried, supra note 364, sets out how surveillance should operate: “Multilateral
surveillance of implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB is one of the
unique features of this system, designed to foster compliance in a positive sprit, with a spotlight shining on non-compliance in front of other members, but accompanied by an open and
standing invitation to find mutually agreeable solutions.”

115

Taylor_jci2 (Do Not Delete)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

12/5/2017 4:12 PM

38:55 (2017)

terms. What the DSU now does is inadequate. DSB surveillance consists of
putting the implementation of each outstanding dispute on the agenda for
each monthly meeting. By providing space on the agenda, the DSB allows
all interested members to raise implementation problems or concerns
regarding any dispute.364 The losing respondent is required to file status
reports about its implementation efforts starting within six months of the
implementation period.365
The DSB has not established requirements for the form or detail of
these status reports.366 Often the reports contain only bald statements that
the respondent member is working on the issue.367 While the DSB retains
jurisdiction over the implementation “until the issue is resolved,”368 it has
not adopted any procedure to follow up if the continuous finger-pointing of
the surveillance process of discussions at the DSB meetings fails to bring a
timely or adequate response. The DSB holds special sessions to establish
panels or adopt panel reports369 and to discuss issues of great importance
and for DSU negotiating sessions. However, the DSB has never held
extended meetings regarding compliance in individual cases, not even when
they have gone on for years and provoked concerns from within the
membership.370
364The fact that all WTO Members—not affected parties—are free to raise issues about
compliance signals that the surveillance is a community function the entire DSB has a stake
in whether the respondent complies promptly and in good faith.
365DSU, supra note 14, at art. 21.6.
366The status reports provided are often without any details that would allow the
complainant or the DSB to judge whether the respondent is working towards compliance.
See Guohua, Mercurio & Yongjie, supra note 42, at 245 (“The implementing Member is not
required to identify the changes, such as the offending measures it will remove or
implementing legislation that will bring it into compliance with the ruling. Members are not
even required to specify any sort of implementation schedule or consult with the winning
party over implementation. Put simply, no good faith need be shown during the entire
implementation period.”). See also Carolyn G. Gleason & Pamela D. Walther, The WTO
Dispute Settlement Implementation Procedures: A System in Need of Reform, 31 LAW &
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 709, 719 (2000) (noting that the system requires little; the parties could, if
both agree, to consult during the process but that nothing stops the respondent from using the
period as “a tool for buying several months of additional time to evade its obligations”).
367See the response of the Status Report Regarding Implementation of the DSB
Recommendations and Rulings in the Dispute, United States – Section 110(5) of the US
Copyright Act, WT/DS160/24/Add.135 (May 13, 2016), where the U.S. made a status report
on a case – the U.S. Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act – filed in 1999 and for which a
temporary solution was negotiated for the period ending on December 20, 2004. The sole
report of the U.S. consists of this sentence: “The U.S. Administration will work closely with
the U.S. Congress and will continue to confer with the European Union in order to reach a
mutually satisfactory resolution of this dispute.”
368DSU, supra note 14, at art. 21.6.
369Guohua, Mercurio & Yongjie, supra note 42 at 10.
370Fried, supra note 364 (noting “[i]t is not hard to imagine a more robust two-way
interaction between the DSB and the DSB in Special Session” as a way of doing more to
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The WTO is aware of the problem with its surveillance system.
However, the DSB has done nothing to date but point out that “the
Membership has not made the best use of this unique surveillance tool” and
acknowledge that the system requires fixing.371 Giorgio Sacerdoti, a former
member of the Appellate Body, argues for a more effective surveillance
system “to induce more prompt compliance” and tightened procedures that
do not “reward the dragging of feet by the losing party with regards to
compliance with adverse decisions.”372 As the case studies illustrate, the
surveillance system has played no role in the resolving any of the disputes
that have gone to retaliation and beyond.373
A gap in the enforcement provisions of the DSU also poses significant
problems for the system. As noted earlier, the DSU lacks any procedure in
Article 22 for dealing with what happens after retaliation. This gap either
provoked or gave cover to the EU when it decided to extend the fight in the
Hormones dispute by bringing a new dispute over the use of retaliation—
the Continued Suspension dispute. The lack of a post-retaliation procedure
has also left dissatisfied complainants struggling over how to proceed when
retaliation, or the threat of it, produces an inadequate settlement.
The Limits of Retaliation
Along with inadequate surveillance and the lack of a post-retaliation
procedure, the limits of retaliation also empower losing respondents trying
to avoid compliance. The DSU contemplates the use of retaliation but only
under constraints. Any retaliation must be prospective in nature, provided
in a form allowed by the DSU, and in proportion to the harm suffered by
the complainant.374 Many scholars375 and WTO members agree that the
improve DSB surveillance).
371Fernando De Mateo, WTO Dispute Settlement Body – Developments in 2014, WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION (Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
fmateo_14_e.htm. (Amb. De Mateo noted “[t]he start of each DSB meeting is more tolerance
than surveillance, more a formality than a genuine effort at ensuring prompt compliance.”).
372Sacerdoti, supra note 16, at 51.
373DSB oversight, apart from compliance reviews and sanctions requests, has not affected
how the losing party responds. See Steve Charnovitz, An Analysis of Pascal Lamy’s
Proposal on Collective Preferences, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 449, 458–59 (2005) (noting that
there really is no connection between the surveillance carried out by the DSB and the
domestic parties’ process for considering how and whether to come into compliance); see
also Christopher Arup, The State of Play of Dispute Settlement “Law” at the World Trade
Organization, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 897, 902 (2003) (noting that what happens to disputes
still remains within the control of the Member States and the DSU uses soft methods—
monitoring and reporting on implementation and discussions in WTO meetings—to
encourage compliance).
374DSU, supra note 14, at art. 22. (prospective —art. 22.6; allowed by the DSU—art.
22.3 specifying that the suspension of concessions should generally be in the same trade
sector as that of the violative measure; proportional to injury —art. 22.4).
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point of allowing sanctions is both to induce compliance and the rebalance
the level of concessions that would have been in place but for the illegal
measures.376 Yet there is also agreement that the DSU limits on retaliation
were not designed to achieve either goal in every dispute. The disputes that
have gone to retaliation and beyond illustrate this reality. Retaliation has
proven useful only when it is credible,377 when used strategically,378 and
when the complainant has been willing to accept partial compliance.379
In choosing retaliation as one of the remedies for non-compliance, the
DSU built implied threats into the dispute settlement system. 380 It is, in
part, this threat of what sanctions could do which gets most members to
settle or to comply in a timely and adequate manner.381 A DSB-authorized
retaliation brings a great deal more pressure to bear because it carries with it
375See Joost Pauwelyn, The Calculation and design of trade retaliation in context: what is
the goal of suspending WTO obligations?, THE LAW, ECONOMIC AND POLITICS OF
RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 34, 36–38 (Chad B. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn
eds., 2010) (identifying these goals and noting that most of the lawyers writing about the
goal in this length study of retaliation focus on the retaliation goal of inducing compliance).
Id. at 38. But see John H. Jackson, Editorial Comment: International Law Status of WTO
Dispute Settlement: Obligation to Comply or Option to “Buy Out”?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 109,
121–22 (2004) (expressly rejecting the idea of retaliation being aimed at rebalancing
concessions).
376See Lothar Ehring, The European Community’s experience and practice in suspending
WTO obligations, THE LAW, ECONOMIC AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 244, 245 (“The EC, one can safely say, has invariably adopted trade sanctions
for the sole purpose of inducing the responding party . . . to bring about compliance.”)
[hereinafter Ehring]. But see Hudec, supra note 68, at 388. Robert Hudec argues perhaps the
acknowledged expert on both GATT and WTO dispute settlement disagreed completely with
the idea of rebalancing rationale for retaliation. He pointed out that in economic terms it was
“a fiction” and that governments were aware that the rationale made no sense.
377For example, when sanctions power is granted to developed Member States. See
discussion supra Sections Bananas III, FSC, and Byrd Amendment disputes.
378See discussion infra p. 80 for how the EU approached the use of retaliation
authorization in the FSC dispute.
379Rachel Brewster, Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace Reputational
Sanctions, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 259, 288 (2013) [hereinafter Pricing Compliance].
380The Member States definitely act within the shadow of the sanctions remedy. Many
scholars argue that countries comply for a number of reasons including: 1) wanting a
reputation as a supporter of WTO law and the institution, and 2) supporting the WTO DSU
system. See Claus D. Zimmerman, Toleration of Temporary Non–compliance: The
Systematic Safety Value of WTO Dispute Settlement Revisited, 3(2) J. TRADE L. & DEV. 382,
388 (2011); Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Efficient Breach of International Law:
Optional Remedies, “Legalized Non-compliance” and Related Issues, 110 MICH. L. REV.
243, 254 (2011) [hereinafter Posner & Sykes], Trachtman—WTO Cathedral, supra note 7, at
141–43 (2007).
381Hudec, supra note 68, at 388, (noting that the “threat of harm is probably more
influential than the actual harm itself, which can provoke anger”); see also Jide Nzelibe, The
Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in the WTO’s Dispute
Settlement System, 6 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 214, 218 (2005).
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the weight of the membership announcing the harm caused by the illegal
activity and a statement of the respondent’s non-compliance.382 The
implied threat becomes a credible threat.383 This does not mean that the
credible threat will produce the compliance desired by the complainant and
the system. A dispute involving an important enough policy (Bananas
III—colonial preferences; Hormones—food safety; Upland Cotton—pillars
of the farm support system; FSC—how to tax all foreign earned income;
Zeroing—an interpretation of a heavily used import relief statute) or large
enough stakes (large market impacts in cases like Bananas III, Upland
Cotton, and FSC) has led the losing respondent to discount the harms and
take retaliation sometimes for years in effect buying the right to breach.384
Other disputes, like Antidumping Act of 1916, Regional Aircraft,
Upland Cotton, and Zeroing, however, reveal that a credible threat can
prompt some type of resolution. In the case of Zeroing, the threat became
credible when two major complainants announced they would pursue
retaliation authorizations. Despite its insistence on being right about the
legal issue, the United States was not willing to take the hit of retaliation
delivered by two developed countries and trading partners.385 In the case of
Upland Cotton, the United States also proved unwilling to experiment with
cross-retaliation used against U.S. owned intellectual property rights.386
The case studies reveal that neither the use387 nor the size of the
retaliation388 has actually forced a resolution. Instead, what seems to hasten
compliance is the design of the retaliation. The quick resolution of the FSC
dispute suggests that strategic retaliation can work. The EU decision to
target at the U.S. election cycle was clever both in design and in execution
because it made the administration focus on the dispute.389A similar
strategic targeting of the recalcitrant EU member states fighting to retain the
382See Andrew W. Shoyer, Eric M. Solovy & Alexander W. Koff, Implementation and
Enforcement of Dispute Settlement Decisions, 1 THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL,
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1341, 1342 (Patrick F.J. Macrory et al. eds., 2005)
(noting that the chance for retaliation “provides a continuing incentive to change the
offending measure and clearly brands the Member as a violator of the WTO”).
383See Brewster, supra note 25, at 138 (noting that the reputational loss to the respondent
is greatest once sanctions that had been authorized “because the respondent state is
continuing to act outside of the WTO legal framework”).
384See Posner & Sykes, supra note 382, at 260; see also ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, CRIMES &
PUNISHMENTS? RETALIATION UNDER THE WTO 47 (2003).
385See supra pp. 62–63 for a discussion of the ultimate resolution of the Zeroing dispute.
386
See supra pp. 53–54 for a discussion of the ultimate resolution in Upland Cotton. This
reluctance to experiment is linked to the fact that cross-retaliation could, in fact, inflict some
true harm on U.S. intellectual property interests
387See Rolland, supra note 8, at 196–97.
388DSB authorizations for large amounts of retaliation have never been employed. The
EU used only a portion of its authorized retaliation right in the FSC dispute.
389See supra at p. 36 for a discussion of how the EU use of retaliation in the FSC dispute.
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banana regime in Bananas III also worked effectively in getting the EU to a
negotiated settlement.390 Employing the threat of sanctions strategically,
however, requires a country to use effort at home and abroad designing lists
of products for retaliation that will make settlement seem necessary or
attractive.391 The work at home is crucial for choosing retaliation targets in
such a way as to limit the harms that would fall upon domestic importers
counting on the goods from the non-complying country. The work of
selecting, refining and publishing a version of the retaliation lists, which
begins even before seeking formal DSB authorization,392 is also important
for making the retaliation threat more credible and providing leverage in
settlement negotiations.
Another limit of retaliation is that the alternative remedy of crossretaliation has been underutilized. The literature on cross-retaliation makes
the case for this form of sanction as a valuable way of mitigating the power
asymmetries inherent in the DSU system.393 If a non-complying country
has a strong intellectual property tradition and thriving IP-based industries,
the suspension of intellectual property protection could impose substantial
harms.394 It is not clear that the negotiating group will go forward with this
proposal but it is notable that this is the only change to the remedy to make
it to the discussion level. The Chairman’s report on the draft indicates that
as of April 2011 there had not been lengthy discussion of this proposed
390See

supra at pp. 31–32 for how this played out.
See Hudec, supra note 68, at 388 n. 34; see also Scott D. Anderson and Justine
Blanahat, The United States’ experience in suspending WTO obligations, THE LAW,
ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 235–43 (2010);
Ehring, supra note 377, at 248–50 (describing the process of determining the retaliation list
for the FSC dispute).
392Hudec explains that the country planning to use the retaliation authorization counts on
the effects of the retaliation working in several stages. The first stage comes with the
publication of a list of potential targets “a list which is usually considerably larger than the
list eventually chosen.” Second, comes the actual request for authorization, which involves a
“‘final’ list of targets that is also larger than the list that the WTO arbitration will actually
approve. These stages leave those targeted industries with an incentive to get their
government to change its course of action. The third stage is the actual imposition of
sanctions and sometimes “seems less important for its direct political impact than for its
function in giving credibility to the earlier, broader threats in cases to come.” Hudec, supra
note 68, at 388, n.34.
393See Mitchell & Salonidis, supra note 289; Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, La Pirate of
the Caribbean? The Attractions of Suspending TRIPs Obligations, 11(2) J. INT’L. ECON. L.
313 (2008); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, “Gambling” with Sovereignty: Complying with
international obligations or upholding national autonomy, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
AND NATIONAL AUTONOMY 150, 150–55 (Meredith Kolsky Lewis et al. eds. 2010)
[hereinafter Ruse-Khan]; Frederick M. Abbott, Cross-Retaliation in TRIPs: Options For
Developing Countries INT’L CENTRE TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Apr. 2009).
394See Ruse-Khan, supra note 395, at 151–52; see also Mitchell & Salonidis, supra note
289, at 457–73.
391
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amendment. Since collective retaliation would be a community sanction395
and a shift away from the traditional self-help remedy, the report points out
that there would need to be clarification on both when to allow it and on
“the exact sequence of events that would arise under this proposed
procedure.”396
The disputes involving cross-retaliation prove some things. First, the
arbitrators will authorize cross-retaliation for both small and larger
developing countries.397 Second, countries seeking cross-retaliation can use
the threat of retaliation to improve their negotiating position in what will
become a negotiated settlement.398 In the Bananas III dispute, Ecuador was
innovative in creating the first case for cross-retaliation and in designing a
workable way to impose sanctions based on withdrawing intellectual
property protection. Evidence is mixed about whether seeking crossretaliation helped Ecuador in its negotiation with the EU. Although the EU
was concerned about the precedent of cross-retaliation, it was not worried
about Ecuador’s ability to impose significant economic harm through the
device.399 Nevertheless, there is some indication that the pace of
negotiations for the first settlement of the case accelerated by the
approaching deadline once Ecuador received the DSB authorization to
proceed.400
The arbitral interpretation of the right to access cross-retaliation,
however, places real limits on the use of this form of sanctions. Article
22.6 and the reports interpreting it have made it clear that the complainant
bears burdens. The complainant must establish that normal retaliation is
neither “practicable” nor “effective.”401 The complainant must also show
395A move to a sanction by even a group of WTO Member States rather than by the
prevailing complainant is an action by the community rather than authorization of the selfhelp remedy currently employed.
396DSB—Special Session, supra note 8, at A-43. Some countries noted the problems that
could flow from allowing collective retaliation—that any members using retaliation would
risk causing themselves harm and that even collectively developing countries might have a
limited incentive to join in enforcement. See DSB—Special Session, supra note 8, at B-2
including a comment by some Members that those countries choosing to join in an attempt at
collective retaliation would be “likely to suffer from the imposition of retaliatory measures
and thus have limited incentive to join in a ‘group’ to impose retaliation with regard to a
dispute they were not part of.”
397Cross-retaliation was authorized for Ecuador, a small developing country in Bananas
III and for Brazil, a larger developing country in Upland Cotton. Both the United States and
the EU have also sought cross-retaliation rights in the Large Aircraft dispute.
398There is general agreement that this is what happened to Ecuador in Bananas III. See
Mitchell & Salonidis, supra note 288, at 474; Smith supra note 151, at 267–70.
399See Smith, supra note 151, at 267–70.
400Id.; Mitchell & Salonidis, supra note 289, at 475.
401These are two of the requirements established for access to the use of cross-retaliation
in Article 22.3. See DSU supra note 14, at art. 22.3(b). In the 22.6 Arbitrator’s decision
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that circumstances are “serious enough” to warrant the use of crossretaliation.402 In Bananas III, Upland Cotton and Gambling, the
complainants made such showings. The kinds of circumstances they
argued—the importance of the impaired trade to the overall economy
(Ecuador and Antigua),403 trade disparities with the respondent (Antigua)404
and the losses that would come from normal retaliation in trade in goods
(Brazil)405—would prove relatively easy for most developing countries to
establish.
A more limiting requirement for most countries seeking to use crossretaliation, however, is that the complainant is not entitled to complete
discretion over what cross-agreement concessions may be suspended. The
arbitrators’ decisions in these disputes have determined that they have the
right to review and amend the list of proposed sanctions.406 This is
markedly different from the complete discretion—except with regard to
regarding Ecuador’s request, it was noted that the term “practicable” referred to
“availability” or “suitability”. About the concept of “effective” the decision stated that the
term “connotes ‘powerful’ in effect, (making a strong impression), (having an effect or
result). The thrust of this criterion empowers the party seeking suspension to ensure that the
impact of the suspension has the desired result, namely to induce compliance by the Member
which fails to bring WTO-inconsistent measures into compliance with DSB rulings within a
reasonable period of time.” Decision of the Arbitrators, EC—Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas—Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities
under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000) at paras.70, 72
[hereinafter 22.6 Bananas III]. This showing by the Member seeking cross-retaliation is
subject to review by the arbitral panel. Id. at 52.
402This is also a requirement for access to cross-retaliation in Article 22.3. See DSU,
supra note 14, art. 22.3(a). 22.6 Bananas III, supra, at para. 73 (discussing whether the issue
was serious enough for Ecuador); Decision by the Arbitrator, U.S.-Measures Affecting the
Cross Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, Recourse to Arbitration under
Article 22.6 WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007) at Section IV.3 [hereinafter 22.6 Gambling].
(In performing its “case-by-case” analysis of this factor circumstances justifying crossretaliation are “serious enough” only when “the circumstances reach a certain degree or level
of importance” and that this was satisfied in the case of Antigua that was met by the
disparities in size and economies between Antigua and the U.S., Antigua’s limited ability to
export and its extreme reliance on tourism.) The Arbitrator’s decision noted that “the
extremely unbalanced nature of the trading relations between the parties makes it all the
more difficult for Antigua to find a way of ensuring the effectiveness of a suspension of
concessions or other obligations against the United States under the same agreement. Id. at
Section IV.9
403See Frederick M. Abbott, Cross-retaliation in TRIPs: issues of law and practice 536,
540, THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
(Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn, eds. 2010) (discussing Ecuador) [hereinafter Abbott/
Cross-retaliation].
40422.6 Gambling, supra note 402, at Section IV.9.
405Decision by the Arbitrator, U.S.—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Recourse to Arbitration
under Art. 22.6 and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS267/ARB1 (Aug. 31, 2009)
at ¶ 5.221.
40622.6 Bananas III, supra note 401, at ¶ 3.7.
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amount—that members have in designing normal trade in goods retaliation
lists.407
There are also two other limitations on the use of cross-retaliation. The
arbitrators in Bananas III determined that when designing cross retaliation
under the TRIPS Agreement a country should be careful to: (1) suspend
intellectual property obligations of only rights-holders having the same
nationality as the non-complying country, and (2) that cross-retaliation
should have its effects only within the territory of the country using it.408
All of the WTO countries provide intellectual property rights to both
foreign and domestic parties and the goods produced by those rights are
potential exports. Consequently, designing a workable retaliation scheme
under these restraints—even if properly suggested to limit any spillover
impacts on other members—is quite difficult.409 This puts the developing
country planning to seek cross-retaliation to significant or often
overwhelming efforts to come up with a credible threat.
DSU Reform Process and Options for Reform Regarding
The DSU was from the beginning intended for review and potential
amendment by the WTO membership. The first DSU review was to take
place in 1999 after the system had been in place for five years. The review
began at that time but was extended and later extended yet again by a
decision at the 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference. In recent years, the

407In such cases, the requesting party must set out a specific level of suspension (the level
equal to the nullification or impairment it has suffered because of the WTO-inconsistent
measure) and specify the agreement and sectors under which it seeks to suspend concessions.
Decision of the Arbitrators, EC—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), Recourse to Arbitrator under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS26/ARB (July
12, 1999) at para.16. Article 22 does not “define what constitutes a sufficient request for the
suspension of concessions or other obligations.” Guohua, Mercurio & Yonjie, supra note
42, at 260.
408With regard to suspending the IPR obligations of only those sharing the same
nationality of the respondent see 22.6 Bananas III, supra note 401, at ¶¶ 140–47. This
limitation makes it necessary for the requesting party to figure out some methodology for
targeting the appropriate rights holders. See Mitchell & Salonidis, supra note 289. With
regard to the requirement that retaliation to territorial in nature see 22.6 Bananas III, supra
note 377, at 153. This requirement comes about because of the possibility of exports and
obligations of other WTO Member States to allow challenges of infringing goods. See
Mitchell & Salonidis, supra note 289, at 481; Weiner Zdouc, Cross-retaliation and
suspension under the GATS and TRIPs agreements at 523–26, THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND
POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn,
eds. 2010) (explaining the challenges posed by those requirements regarding the operation of
different types of intellectual property rights); Abbott/Cross-retaliation, supra note 403, at
563–75 (discussing the nationality issue and the different ways cross-retaliation could be
used with the various types of intellectual property rights).
409See Mitchell & Salonidis, supra note 2809, at 480–83.
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DSU negotiations have become reform negotiations.410 As of 2017, DSU
negotiations remain on the agenda for the WTO411 and may produce
outcomes for adoption at the 11th Ministerial Conference in December
2017.412
The reform negotiations take place in special sessions of the DSB
devoted solely to these issues and kept apart from the standard work of
surveillance done regarding existing disputes. The reform negotiations
have produced almost twenty major proposals from individual members and
groups of members (such as the Least-Developed Countries and the African
Group) to amend almost every phase of the DSU system and thus virtually
every article in the understanding. This is true despite the general belief
that the overall experience of the DSU system has been positive.
The WTO membership did not provide guidelines or specific
objectives for the DSU negotiations but rather a general mandate to “agree
on improvements and clarifications.” 413 The DSU negotiations are standalone negotiations. Nevertheless, the DSU negotiations seem to run in
tandem with the other Doha Round negotiations.
The most recent in-depth information publicly available on the status
of the DSU negotiations is a report by the then chair of the DSU
negotiations, Ambassador Soto of Costa Rica.414 Chairman Soto’s 2015
410See generally Zimmermann, supra note 74, at 93–123 (following the evolution of the
DSU negotiations from 1997-2004).
411See WTO, Nairobi Ministerial Declaration, supra note 18.
412The current DSU negotiations are focused on 12 thematic issues:
•
Third Party Rights
•
Panel composition
•
Remand
•
Mutually agreed solutions
•
Strictly confidential information
•
Sequencing
•
Post-retaliation
•
Transparency and amicus curiae briefs
•
Timeframes
•
Developing country interests, including special and differential treatment
•
Flexibility and Member control
•
Effective compliance

The goal of the current chair, Stephan Karau, is to have negotiations on DSU reform far
enough along for outcomes to go to the WTO’s 11th Ministerial in Buenos Aires, Argentina
in December 2017.
413This has left the DSU negotiators free to determine what issues are important enough
to move forward for amendment. It was also made clear when the 2001 authorization was
provided that the DSU negotiations did not have to await the conclusion of the Doha Round
and become part of the single undertaking—the WTO tradition of having all agreements
adopted together at the same time.
414WTO, Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Report by the Chairman,
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report provides a discussion of the twelve themes pursued in the recent
DSU negotiations but offers no draft text.415 The 2011 Special Session
report provided draft text on one theme highly relevant to the problem of
sustained non-compliance—”Effective compliance.”416 The draft text from
that period would add new procedures to the enforcement phase of the
DSU—Articles 21 and 22.
The draft text and its accompanying report are illuminating for what
they say and what they do not say. There have been numerous proposals
made by members and analyzed by scholars advocating either replace or
supplement the retaliation remedy with a system of monetary damages or
fines,417 or collective retaliation.418 Most of these proposals have not
achieved real traction in the negotiations.
Rather than offer a new remedy the negotiators have focused on
improving some of the problems in the DSU provisions dealing with
compliance. For example, the draft text would amend Article 21 to deal
with one aspect of delay in compliance. The amendment would allow
disputants to begin consultations that could lead to a settlement at the midpoint of the “reasonable period of time” given for a losing respondent to
comply.419 This would mean that the winning disputant would not have to
TN/DS/27, Aug. 6, 2015 [hereinafter 2015 DSU Report].
415There is a draft text the Member States are currently working on from 2013,
JOB/DS/14, that has not been de-restricted.
416See DSB-Special Session, supra note 8, at B-2 (June 21-25, 2010), B-4-5 (September
20-24, 2010), B-6-7 (November 1-5, 2010), B-11-13 (January 17-21, 2011), B-17-19 (March
7-11, 2011), and B-22-23 (April 4-8, 2011).
417Many Member States have proposed monetary damages as a replacement remedy. See
Proposal by the African Group, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding,
TN/DS/W/15 at 3 (Sept. 25, 2002) [hereinafter African Group Proposal]; Communication
from Ecuador: Contribution of Ecuador to the Improvement of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding of the WTO, TN/DS/W9 at 3-4 (July 8, 2002); [hereinafter African Group
Proposal]; Communication from Ecuador: Contribution of Ecuador to the Improvement of
the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO, TN/D5/W9 at 3-4 (July 8, 2002);
Communication from China: Improving the Special and Differential in the Dispute
Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/29 at 2 (Jan. 22, 2003); Communication from Kenya’s
Text for the African Group Proposals on Dispute Settlement Understanding Negotiations,
TN/DS/W/42 at 3 (Jan. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Kenya Proposal].
418See Kenya Proposal, supra at 3; Communication from Haiti, Text for LDC Proposal on
Dispute Settlement Understanding Negotiations, TN/DS/W/37 at 3 (Jan. 22, 2003); African
Group Proposal, supra at 3.
419See DSB—Special Session, supra note 8, at A-14.
[(a) After the midpoint of the reasonable period of time, or after the DSB meeting
referred to in paragraph 3 where the Member concerned does not [have][need] a
reasonable period of time pursuant to paragraph 3, each party (to the dispute shall,
if requested by another party, accord sympathetic consideration to any request for
consultations in good faith with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution
regarding the implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.
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wait until the respondent has exhausted all of the time given for compliance
before knowing what the respondent intends to do. If this amendment goes
into the DSU, the disputants would be on the way to an earlier settlement.
The draft text also contains proposals aimed at addressing the power
asymmetries that limit the value of the current DSU remedy. 420 A proposed
amendment to Article 22 would allow in any developing/developed country
dispute for the developing country complainant to have complete freedom
over the form of retaliation it would employ. The amendment would
provide “the right to seek authorization to suspend concessions or other
obligations in any sectors under any covered agreements.”421 If adopted,
this amendment would remove all of the limitations currently placed by the
DSU text and AB interpretation on access to cross-retaliation for
developing countries in disputes. Cross-retaliation would become a much
more useful tool for developing country members.
The other proposed amendment to the remedies article, Article 22,
would allow for the use of collective retaliation. What this contemplates is
the DSB authorizing another member or group of members to retaliate on
the behalf of a developing country member if it can demonstrate that
suspending concessions would have negative economic consequences in the
winning developing country.422 It is not clear that the negotiating group
[The party requesting consultations shall notify its request to the DSB and the
relevant Councils and Committees.]
420Some,

more than others, might help with this problem. One proposed amendment
would make all compensation offers be made in monetary form for developing country
members. Since compensation is almost never offered, however, such an alteration would
not be useful.
421See DSB—Special Session, supra note 8, at A-16.
[3bis Notwithstanding the provisions contained in paragraph 3, in a dispute between a
developing country Member and a developed country Member, the developing country
Member shall have the right to seek authorization to suspend concessions or other
obligations in any sectors under any covered agreements.]
422See DSB—Special Session, supra note 8, at A-16.
[(b) Where it is demonstrated that the suspension of concessions or other
obligations would have negative consequences on the economy of a
developing country Member, the DSB may, upon request, authorize a
Member or a group of Members to suspend concessions on behalf of the
affected Member. The following principles and procedures shall apply to such
requests:
(I) Before making such a request; the developing country Member shall refer
the matter to arbitration for determination of the level of nullification and
impairment, which shall be done [taking into account the legitimate
expectations of the developing country Member]. The arbitration shall further
take into account the effects of the suspension of concessions upon the
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will go forward with this proposal but it is notable that this is only change
to the remedy to make it to the discussion level. The Chairman’s report on
the draft indicates that as of April 2011 there had not been lengthy
discussion of this proposed amendment. Since collective retaliation would
be a community sanction423 and a shift away from the traditional self-help
remedy, the report points out that there would need to be clarification on
both when to allow it and on “the exact sequence of events that would arise
under this proposed procedure.”424
Another important part of the 2011 Chairman’s draft text deals with
another major aspect of sustained non-compliance—the acceptable
discipline for the end game. The negotiators were considering two
competing proposals to establish a post-retaliation procedure. Either
proposal would fill the biggest enforcement gap in the current DSU.425 As
of 2015, a similar concern was expressed about the need to strengthen
surveillance by having administrative measures applied in the event of noncompliance beyond the reasonable period of time,426 having the respondent
“provide an enhanced notification of compliance.”427
In the 2011 text, the focus was on how to establish whether true
compliance has occurred so that the authorized retaliation can end.428 The
economy of the developing country.
(ii) The arbitration shall consider whether the suspension of concessions or
other obligations in other sectors by the developing country Member would be
[appropriate to effectively encourage the withdrawal of the measure found to
be inconsistent with a covered Agreement, taking into account possible effects
on that developing country Member].
423A move to a sanction by even a group of WTO Member States rather than by the
prevailing complainant is an action by the community rather than authorization of the selfhelp remedy currently employed.
424DSB—Special Session, supra note 8, at A-43. Some countries noted the problems that
could flow from allowing collective retaliation—that any members using retaliation would
risk causing themselves harm and that even collectively developing countries might have a
limited incentive to join in enforcement. See DSB—Special Session, supra note 8, at B-2
including a comment by some Members that those countries choosing to join in an attempt at
collective retaliation would be “likely to suffer from the imposition of retaliatory measures
and thus have limited incentive to join in a ‘group’ to impose retaliation with regard to a
dispute they were not part of.”
425See infra p. 76-83 for a discussion of the lack of a post-retaliation procedure. For a
discussion of the consequences of this lack, see also Townsend & Charnovitz, supra note 26
(detailing what happened in the battle over compliance in Upland Cotton).
4262015 DSU Report, supra note 388, at 9 (¶ 3.43).
427Id. at 10 (¶ 3.52).
428DSB—Special Session, supra note 8, at B-14, ¶ 84.
“Participants confirmed the objective of having explicit rules on post-retaliation to address
the question of how a disagreement as to the existence or consistency of measures taken to

127

Taylor_jci2 (Do Not Delete)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

12/5/2017 4:12 PM

38:55 (2017)

two proposals in that text differ mainly on when the non-complying
disputant must provide information to the DSB that it has taken action to
come into compliance. One version would have this notification come as
part of the respondent’s request for an Article 21.5 compliance panel to
review whether the new measure that it has passed brings it into
compliance.429 The other version would have the respondent—prior to
entering into any consultations about withdrawing sanctions or any 21.5
review—provide the DSB with a much more detailed notification of what it
has done to comply. This notification would include a detailed description
of its new measure, its date of entry into force, the text of the measure and
all relevant documentation as well as a “detailed factual and legal
explanation of how the measure . . . has removed any inconsistency with, or
provided a solution to any nullification or impairment of benefits under, the
covered agreements.”430 The second version of the post-retaliation

comply might be resolved where retaliation has been authorized, and how the authorization
may be terminated.”
429DSB—Special Session, supra note 8, at A-17. The first version would amend Article
22.8 by adding the following:
[(b) Where the DSB has authorized the suspension of concessions or other
obligations against a Member and there is a subsequent disagreement as to the
existence of consistency with a covered agreement of a measure taken to comply
with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, the Member concerned may
have recourse to the procedures of paragraph 5 of Article 21 as modified by this
paragraph. In such a case:
(i) in its request for the establishment of a panel, the Member concerned shall set
out the specific measures taken to comply, the text of these measures, and a factual
and legal description of how these measures bring the Member into compliance
with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB;
(ii) where a member that has been authorized to suspend concessions or other
obligations considers that a measure taken to comply is inconsistent with any other
provision of the covered agreements, or that the Member concerned has otherwise
not brought itself into compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the
DSB, it may submit to the DSB, no later than [xx days] after the establishment of a
panel, a notice setting out any additional measure taken to comply and a brief
summary of the legal basis for its disagreement with the Member concerned; and
(iii) for the purpose of these proceedings, the word “document” in the terms of
reference of the panel under paragraph 1 of Article 7 comprises the request for the
establishment of the panel and the notice submitted under subparagraph (ii) [of this
provision].
430DSB—Special

Session, supra note 8, at A-18.
The second version, with its greater requirements for detail, is:
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procedure would provide the material necessary for real negotiations
between the disputants and for useful surveillance by the DSB. It would
limit the chances that the losing respondent could game the system with
proposed “solutions” that do not really offer compliance.
There has also been consideration of the need for also more thorough
reporting to the DSB when disputants reach a mutually agreed solution to a
dispute. In 2015, Ambassador Soto reported that the DSU negotiations on
this issue had reached a “convergence on the goal of improving
notification” of such settlements.431 According to his report, the work
ahead is to finalize the text “clarifying in particular the level of detail to be
required in the notification.”432 A requirement that such notifications to the
DSB be more complete could only improve the DSU as it operates.
What the Proposed Reforms Fails to Tackle and Why This Matters
The DSU reform negotiations and the proposals for reforming Article
21 fail to address a major flaw in the enforcement phase of the DSU—the
absence of anything approaching an adequate system of surveillance. There
are two possible reasons for this WTO failure to engage on oversight as part
of an institutional response to non-compliance. One reason could be that
the members regard the dispute settlement system solely as a self-enforcing
regime. In such a vision, successful complainants should bear the weight
and do the work to procure a settlement or to resort to retaliation to induce
any compliance. After all, the default by the respondent affects only the
complainant(s) and third parties.
Such a reading of the DSU and its role in the WTO system, however,

[(b) After the DSB has authorized a complaining party to suspend concessions or
other obligations pursuant to paragraph 6 and 7 (in this paragraph referred to as
the “authorized party”), the Member concerned may notify the DSB that it has
fully removed the inconsistency with a covered agreement, or that it has
provided a solution to the nullification or impairment of benefits. Such
notification shall be accompanied by:
(i) a detailed description of any measure taken by the Member concerned, its
date of entry into force, any text of such measure, and a list of documents that
the Member concerned considers relevant for the assessment of implementation;
and
(ii) a detailed factual and legal explanation of how the measure taken by the
member concerned has removed any inconsistency with, or provided a solution
to any nullification or impairment of benefits under, the covered agreements.
4312015

DSU Report, supra note 388, at 11.

432Id.
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is too narrow. As the disputes going to retaliation and beyond illustrate, 433
the failure of major players to accept and incorporate WTO discipline in
difficult cases erodes the institution. To remain effective and productive, an
international organization must create not only results but also legitimate
results. There can be no legitimacy, real or perceived, in a system that
provides one type of resolution for the powerful and another set for the
weak. It is not just the disputants that are affected when institutional
resources and expertise434 are used on major disputes that drag on and on
without resolution. As many of the cases show (Bananas III, Upland
Cotton, Zeroing, and the Byrd Amendment), there are major effects on the
recognized third parties to the disputes as well as on world markets
impacted by the continuance of the WTO-illegal measure.435 The third
parties and often many other members without the capacity436 to join in the
dispute suffer trade losses when sustained non-compliance occurs. In other
words, there is a strong systemic interest in this problem.
Another reason for a failure to grapple with how the DSB conducts
surveillance is that the drafters of the DSU did not spend much time on this
part of the design of the DSU. Even though “effective compliance” is a
theme, the reform negotiations have followed this pattern. The proposals in
the 2011 Chairman’s draft giving the DSU greater control over what
happens post-retaliation are a good starting point, but only that.
III. CONCLUSION: A POSSIBLE REFORM – ACTUALIZING
SURVEILLANCE IN THE DSU SYSTEM
The drafters of the DSU understood that some disputes would not
resolve without encouragement and oversight from the members. However,
there was no model upon which to base a surveillance system and a
preference for member-control over resolving disputes. As the case studies
and the examination of how the DSU system operates reveal, the result has
been no real oversight of compliance. The WTO failure to deal with the
surveillance is a large gap in a dispute system that otherwise illustrates legal
accountability.437 The DSU system offers internal accountability. It holds
433See infra p. 82-83 for illustrations of how these cases have spillover effects for many
countries.
434The WTO as an institution has made major commitments in the form of the Secretariat,
the panelists and the Appellate Body to the cases involving sustained non-compliance. Large
developed Member States benefit not only from access to the DSU system but also from the
resources that the system devotes to dispute resolution.
435See Pricing Compliance, supra note 355, at 289 (discussing the impacts on other
countries in the Hormones dispute).
436Many developing country Member States suffer from a lack of capacity to participate
in WTO disputes. Even the existence of the WTO Legal Advisory Centre and its legal aid
approach cannot fill the gap.
437Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World
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members to a set of standards, judges whether the standards are met, and
sanctions those members failing to meet those standards.438 Nevertheless,
the DSU system lacks an effective surveillance component that would
enhance accountability.439
Accountability theory440 suggests asking six important questions about
any regime purporting to provide accountability. Who is liable or
accountable to whom; what are they called to account for; through what
processes are used to assure accountability; by what standards is acceptable
behavior to be judged; and what are the . . . effects of finding a breach of
those standards?441
It is useful to ask these six questions about the surveillance component
of the DSU system to search for how to make it effective. The first
question is about who must answer. In the DSU system, this answer is
actually two-fold. Obviously, the losing respondent is accountable, as it has
taken on an obligation to comply.442 If the respondent fails, it is denying
another member its rights under the relevant WTO agreement(s) and it may
be failing its obligations under the DSU. However, the DSB is also
Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 37 (2005) (describing the WTO Dispute Settlement
Mechanism, the operations of the Hague Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia, and the
creation of a new International Criminal Court as illustrating the “incursions that conceptions
of legal accountability have made in world politics”). Grant and Keohane define
accountability as occurring when “some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of
standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these
standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been
met.” Id. at 29.
438Richard B. Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance, 108 AM.
J. INT’L L. 211, 245 (2014) (Stewart agrees with Grant and Keohane that legal type of
institutional accountability mechanism like the other four (electoral, hierarchical,
supervisory, and fiscal) satisfies these three requirements. According to Stewart, these are
the only essential requirements.) [hereinafter Stewart].
439With ineffective surveillance, a losing respondent does not face the full consequences
of non-compliance. It does not have to calculate how to behave based on a concern about the
DSB. According to Stewart, the “prospect of having to provide such accounting [of the
accounter’s conduct] and the potential consequences of a negative evaluation provide ex ante
incentives for the accounter to give appropriate consideration to the interests of the account
holder in making decisions.” Id. at 246.
440See Jerry Mashaw, Structuring a “Dense Complexity”: Accountability and the Project
of Administrative Law, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, at 17 (2005). For an analysis of the
accountability literature, see Anna Drake, Locating Accountability: Conceptual and
Categorical Challenges in the Literature, POLICY REPORT 02, Entwined and the International
Institute
for
Sustainable
Development
(Nov.
2012),
available
at:
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/locating_accountability.pdf.
441Mashaw, supra note 440, at 17, argues that all accountability regimes should be able to
answer these interconnected questions.
442DSU, supra note 14, at art. 21.1 (“Prompt compliance with recommendations or
rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure the effective resolution of disputes to the
benefit of all Members.”)
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accountable to the WTO membership. It is the body entrusted with
maintaining “surveillance [of] the implementation [of] adopted
recommendations or rulings.”443 If the DSB inadequately performs this
function, it leaves the policing of a WTO system to the disputants. This is
problematic in a system that defines itself as “a central element in providing
security and predictability in the multilateral trading system.” 444 The DSU
system does not operate as well as it should when disputes fail to resolve,
some members flout obligations to act in good faith and comply, and there
are no observable consequences for defaults.445
The answer to the second question—about to whom an account is
made—also involves the disputants and the WTO.
The winning
complainant deserves a full and prompt report from the respondent about
what steps it plans to take and when it plans to do so. Neither a full report
about actions taken or planned nor a believable period for compliance is
currently required. The WTO membership deserves an account of not only
about how difficult cases resolve and how long that takes, but also about
how the DSB oversees compliance.
The third accountability question focuses on what should be in the
report. This is perhaps the easiest question to answer about the DSB
surveillance regime. The respondent must show that it has complied with its
WTO obligations and not abused the DSU process. The DSB must prove
that it actually performs a surveillance function that contributes to the
functioning of the dispute settlement system.
The fourth question asks what processes are available to assure
accountability. The current DSB surveillance regime has little in the way of
process, and as a result, it is ineffective. There is a lack of transparency in
DSB surveillance. Transparency about compliancethe how and when of
ithas an important role to play in any accountability mechanism.446 The
DSB does not make available to the membership any information about the
details of compliance or the period actually taken for compliance. What the
current DSU system offers is a searchable database on all DSU disputes and
their resolutions.
However, as explained earlier, the database is
inadequate.447 There is no listing of the compliance record for all WTO
443Id.

at art. 21.6.
at art. 3.2.
445Stewart, supra note 438, at 254 (A legal accountability mechanism should “enable
account holders to enforce the obligations of accounters ‘to reveal, to explain, and to justify
what one does,’ and to obtain remedies for deficient performance.”).
446Id. at 253 (Transparency is not an accountability mechanism but a practice that “may
play a role in the operation of accountability mechanisms.”). Without transparency, it is
impossible to “effectively track and evaluate an accounter’s performance and take
appropriate [] action.” Id. at 258.
447See Edward Lee, Measuring TRIPs Compliance and Defiance: The WTO Compliance
Scoreboard, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 401, 417 (2011), who points out that: “The WTO website
444Id.
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disputes available in one place. Finding out the compliance details of any
particular dispute—whether by settlement or by the losing respondent’s
withdrawal of the offending measure—requires extensive research into the
WTO website, the DSB Annual Report, non-WTO materials, publicly
available materials from the disputants or communications from the
disputant governments, and following the research efforts of WTO
scholars.448
The lack of a procedure for complete compliance reporting and the
transmission of such reports results in less accountability. Only required to
provide status reports, losing respondents file reports often consisting of
bald statements that action is being taken. The DSB makes the minutes of
its monthly meetings containing the status reports and responses publicly
available.449 Since there are no detailed compliance reports in these
minutes, however, it is impossible to track the compliance status of a
dispute without extensive research. Once a dispute has failed to resolve and
drags on for years, only the most motivated member states and scholars can
find out what, if anything, has been done about compliance.
The proposed revisions to Article 21, requiring detailed reports by the
respondent, would ease some of the problems. However, the DSB needs to
do much more to have a process that would both encourage compliance and
inform the membership. First steps in such a process would be to: (1)
require the posting of detailed status reports and; (2) create a full
compliance scoreboard.450 Maintaining a scoreboard on the WTO website
would be in keeping with the WTO commitment to transparency451 and to
surveillance.452 To do this scoreboard, the DSB would have to create a
administered by the WTO Secretariat, tracks every dispute brought before the WTO,
including in the event of a violation, a country’s efforts to correct a law found by a WTO
decision to be in violation of a treaty obligation. But the WTO website does so in a way that
is not all that helpful.” [hereinafter Lee].
448All of these sources—except for direct interviews with WTO Member States—were
necessary to compile the case studies in this article.
449The WTO issues the DSB monthly reports shortly after each meeting.
450See Lee, supra note 447, at 418–20 who first offered the suggestion of such a
scoreboard. Lee wanted a scoreboard to highlight the importance of tracking compliance
with TRIPs obligations. However, the problem is broader than compliance with any one
WTO agreement. As it stands now, it is impossible to track the compliance in any WTO
dispute that goes to retaliation and beyond.
451The WTO commitment to transparency comes in GATT Article X.
452The WTO made a major commitment to monitoring and surveillance as part of the
machinery necessary for creating an effective organization. See Pascal Lamy, Director
General of the WTO, Speech, Evolving trade increases need for “active transparency” (Oct.
22, 2007), available at: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl78_e.htm. See also
Craig VanGrasstek, THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 271,
273–77 (concerning the WTO obligations on Member States for notifications) and 287–292
(describing the history of how surveillance has been done through the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism of the organization).
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compliance report rather than just rely on the notifications it receives. To
be complete, the scoreboard would have to note the method and timing of
compliance.453
Another method for enhancing surveillance would be for the DSB to
go beyond reporting information. One way to do this would be to establish
a peer review system. The DSB would have to move beyond the standard
WTO practices of surveillance through self-reporting and publication of
information454 and into peer review of the type conducted by organizations
such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and
the International Monetary Fund. While these institutions have different
missions and different sets of powers from the WTO, each has developed
surveillance mechanisms that monitor whether individual members comply
with obligations.455 As a result, they have achieved much more with
surveillance.456 The WTO should get ideas from these institutions for how
to design a peer review system.
One part of a peer review system should be a compliance committee
within the DSB. The committee membership could consist of interested
members. The role of the compliance committee would be to review the
state of each dispute. For those that go to retaliation and beyond, the
committee should confer after a losing respondent provides a detailed report

453The scoreboard would need to show whether the dispute ended with the withdrawal of
the offending measure, by compensation, or by a settlement (including the form of the
settlement, i.e., whether the settlement was a final settlement or an interim settlement on the
way to a final settlement).
454For discussions of these types of surveillance see Terry Collins-Williams & Robert
Wolfe, Transparency as a Trade Tool: The WTO’s Cloudy Windows, 9 WORLD TRADE REV.
551–81 (2010); Andrew Lang & Joanne Scott, The Hidden World of WTO Governance, 20
EUR. J. INT’L. L. 575–614 (2009). According to Collins-Williams and Wolfe, the dispute
settlement process provides one of the principal forms of monitoring and surveillance in the
WTO “although it is based on the dubious behavioral proposition that ‘legally binding’
judicial decisions are implemented automatically.
455The most effective example of a peer review mechanism comes in the system set up by
the OECD to track implementation by its Member States of their obligations under the AntiBribery Convention. The OECD describes the peer review system and posts the reports it
produces as well as an annual report regarding compliance on its website, available at:
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/countrymonitoringoftheoecdantibriberyconvention.htm.
For a discussion of peer review mechanisms and how they work, see Georgios
Dimitropoulos, Compliance Through Collegiality: Peer Review in International Law, 37
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 275 (2016). Dimitropoulos describes the phases and
procedures of peer review systems at 292-294 and analyzes the efforts of the OECD peer
review mechanism at 305–08.
456The OECD peer review system issues reports each year about the effectiveness of each
country’s efforts at implementation of anti-bribery laws and enforcement in the form of
prosecutions against those bribing foreign governments for business advantage. The U.K.
responded to critical peer review by passing new anti-bribery legislation in 2010.

134

Taylor_jci2 (Do Not Delete)

12/5/2017 4:12 PM

Beyond Retaliation
38:55 (2017)

about expected compliance and periodically report to the DSB membership
and the disputants on the status of compliance and a timeline for an
expected resolution. The compliance review reports from the committee
should become part of the DSB annual report that currently produces an
overview of how the system operates. The creation of such a committee
and the publication of its reports would not undercut any post-retaliation
procedure or interfere with the disputants’ ability to negotiate a settlement.
Rather, a DSU compliance committee would complement those efforts.
According to a former chair, the DSB does better if it has a rule or
procedure to follow.457 Having to respond to a peer review report and see
an annual report publishing detailed evidence about its of non-compliance
would highlight the reputation costs for a non-complying member state.
The fifth accountability question asks about the appropriate standards
for judging acceptable behavior. The best place to look for these standards
is the DSU itself. According to the DSU, the standards for a wellfunctioning system include: (1) prompt settlement,458 (2) a resolution
consistent with the relevant WTO agreement or agreements,459 and (3)
absent a mutually agreed solution, a resolution after the arbitral process that
secures the withdrawal of the offending measure.460 The current system
fails the first standard. Even the average DSU dispute fails to resolve
promptly, the cases involving substantial non-compliance typically drag on
much longer.461 Most WTO disputes end with resolutions consistent with
the WTO agreements. The disputes that go to retaliation and beyond do not
meet this standard. In five of the disputes, the losing respondent gained a
settlement that allowed it to continue a WTO-illegal practice in some cases
temporarily and in others permanently.462 Such resolutions are never
preferable but allowable if the WTO membership approves by granting a
waiver.463 In such cases, the membership is making a determination that the
good of settlement outweighs the bad of the continued illegal conduct.
457See Fried, supra note 364, at 5 (“The perceived weakness of the DSB’s surveillance
function is perhaps part of a more fundamental institutional weakness of the DSB in
fulfilling its function of ‘administering’ the DSU…. Where the rules allow for automatic
action, the DSB acted quickly and without fail. But where the outcome was not prescribed
by the DSU, the DSB fostered a healthy debate but then “takes note of the statements’, and
leaves for another day and another forum the identification of a solution.”).
458DSU, supra note 14, at art. 3.3.
459Id. at art. 3.5.
460Id. at art. 3.7.
461See discussion supra Sections Hormones, Bananas III, and Foreign Sales Corporation.
462See discussion supra Sections Bananas III, Hormones, Byrd Amendment, Upland
Cotton, and Zeroing.
463This route was only used in one of the cases of sustained non-compliance – Bananas
III. The more recent practice has been for the disputants to create interim settlements that
they agree to report later to the DSB as mutually agreed solutions. See Alschner, supra note
52.
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However, only in the Bananas III dispute did the disputants pursue the
waiver option. In the four other disputes, the disputants simply reported
negotiated settlements to the DSB.
The final standard for judging the DSU system—if the disputants
cannot reach a mutually agreed solution—is whether the losing respondent
removes the offending measure. In two of the disputes, Hormones and
Gambling, the losing respondent may never remove the offending
measure.464 Given the nature of the U.S. measures and the settlements it
reached in Upland Cotton, it is also unlikely that the United States will ever
completely withdraw the illegal subsidies.465 What this suggests is that the
DSB surveillance has failed to meet its own requirements.
The final accountability question asks the consequences for breaches.
The current DSB regime imposes no real consequences. It is true that the
DSB minutes of meetings publish the complaints by frustrated
complainants, third parties and other members about a losing respondent’s
failures. However, the DSB never takes steps beyond recording the
complaints. Here it is more difficult to offer a prescription. Even if it had
an effective surveillance regime of the type proposed above, the DSB could
not guarantee compliance. However, by having such a system it could
make the losing respondent pay a heavier price in loss of reputation.466 If it
becomes clear to the membership through surveillance that sustained noncompliance is occurring, the losing respondent might choose compliance or
partial compliance to preserve its reputation as well as its power in the rulemaking aspects of the WTO. A new surveillance process focused on
timeliness, transparency in information about compliance efforts, and
coordinated naming and shaming from peer review and WTO annual
reports could only constitute an improvement.

464At this point, it is difficult to determine whether the EU and U.S. will completely
resolve the Hormones dispute or continue to extend the Beef MOU. With regard to the
Gambling dispute, the U.S. appears unwilling to negotiate with Antigua.
465In Upland Cotton, the U.S. has established a pattern of passing post-dispute legislation
that continues subsidy practices found illegal by the WTO. See Townsend & Charnovitz,
supra note 26, at 439–47.
466See Brewster, supra note 381, at 269 (Brewster points out that are a reputation issues
that drive countries and that the dispute resolution systems adopted in international law
attempt to take advantage of this reality.).
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